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We provide theoretical and empirical evidence that policy uncertainty can significantly affect firm
level investment and entry decisions in the context of international trade. When market entry costs
are sunk, policy uncertainty can create a real option value of waiting to enter foreign markets until
conditions improve or uncertainty is resolved. Using a dynamic, heterogeneous firms model we show
that: (i) investment and entry into export markets is reduced when trade policy is uncertain, and (ii)
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are valuable to exporters even if applied trade barriers are currently
low or zero. We derive a structural equation that predicts how firm entry responds to changes in applied
tariffs and a theory-based measure of policy uncertainty.  Our novel approach using observable trade
policies allows us to estimate the impact of policy uncertainty and quantify its aggregate implications.
We apply this method to Portugal's accession to the European Community in 1986 using new firm-level
trade data. We find that (i) the trade policy reform accounted for a large fraction of the observed Portuguese
exporting firms' entry and sales upon accession (ii) the accession removed uncertainty about future
preferences and (iii) this uncertainty channel accounted for a large fraction of the predicted growth.
These results have broader implications for other PTAs and our approach can be applied to analyze
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Firms face considerable uncertainty about future conditions aﬀecting their costs, demand and proﬁtability.
This uncertainty can arise from purely economic shocks–e.g. to productivity or tastes–or policy shocks–
e.g. monetary and ﬁscal innovations, tax and regulatory reforms. The role of future conditions is particularly
important when ﬁrms must decide on costly irreversible investments such as adopting a technology, producing
a new good or selling in a new market. In these cases, ﬁrms may wait for current conditions to be suﬃciently
good or for uncertainty about future conditions to be suﬃciently low before they invest.
We examine the impact of policy uncertainty on a ﬁrm’s decision to invest and export to new markets,
which is an interesting setting for several reasons. First, the rising share of exports in ﬁrms’ sales increased
their exposure to foreign policy uncertainty. Second, trade policy can be quite uncertain, as we discuss in
detail in section 3. This uncertainty arises not because trade policy changes very frequently but because
when it does, the changes can be quite large and persistent. One recent example was the widespread fear
during the great recession that countries would shut their markets to international trade, as they did in
the 1930’s.1 Third, there is growing evidence that ﬁrms must incur substantial ﬁxed costs before exporting
(cf. Roberts and Tybout, 1997). To capture the interaction between these ﬁxed cost investments policy
uncertainty we develop a tractable dynamic heterogenous ﬁrm model and derive the impacts of current and
future trade policy on investment and export decisions. We then test the predictions of the model and
quantify its aggregate implications by combining novel and detailed ﬁrm-level and trade policy data.
Our work is also motivated by the importance of domestic policy uncertainty for economic activity, which
has been the subject of recent debate.2 The basic theoretical impacts of uncertainty on investment are
understood (cf. Bernanke, 1983 and section 2), and there is some recent evidence for the eﬀects of aggregate
volatility shocks.3 But there is little empirical evidence of the importance of policy uncertainty for ﬁrms. This
is partly due to the diﬃculty in measuring policy uncertainty and linking it to speciﬁc investment decisions.
The international trade setting can help address these issues. First, it allows us to construct detailed
measures of policy uncertainty that are easy-to-interpret and vary across several dimensions: countries,
1This fear was further fuelled by the worldwide trade collapse that started in late 2008 and was the sharpest trade contraction
since WWII. To counter this uncertainty, leaders of the G-20 repeatedly pledged that “We will not repeat the historic mistakes
of protectionism of previous eras.” http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summit-aims/summit-communique/
2Some have argued that the recent weak recovery in the U.S. is partially due to uncertainty over ﬁscal pol-
icy and regulatory reform. See for example, “Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee,” August 9, 2011,
http://federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20110809.htm; “Uncertainty and the Slow Recovery,” Wall Street
Journal, January 4, 2010. Becker, Gary S., Steven J. Davis and Kevin M. Murphy.
3Bloom et al. (2007) and Bloom (2009) provide evidence that shocks to stock market volatility delay ﬁrm-level investment
and attenuate its response to demand shocks.
1products and time. Second, we can trace the eﬀects of these measures to speciﬁc ﬁrm investment and sales
decisions that also vary along those dimensions. To the extent that other taxes are persistent but uncertain,
as trade policy is, our ﬁndings for a strong role of trade policy uncertainty (henceforth TPU) suggest there
is a potentially important role of domestic policy uncertainty as well on ﬁrms.
Our basic theoretical framework can be applied to diﬀerent settings. However, in order to clearly measure
trade policy uncertainty and estimate its eﬀects, we must focus on a speciﬁc one. In this paper we analyze
preferential trade agreements (PTAs), whereby countries eliminate protection relative to a subset of partners,
which is the most active form of trade policy in the last 20 years. As of July 2010, there were 283 PTAs in
force–a dramatic increase since 1990–and 474 have so far been notiﬁed to the World Trade Organization
(WTO).4 There are multiple reasons for PTAs and active research on their real value. PTAs can be a source
of policy uncertainty because in any given year, an exporter to a market is now more likely to have a price
advantage (if it becomes a PTA member) or disadvantage (if another country does). While on average
countries may currently face more TPU due to rising numbers of PTAs, the members of each PTA secure
preferences, which can lower the TPU they face in exporting to that market. We discuss this motivation for
several recent PTAs in section 3.
To examine the impact of TPU on ﬁrms we require detailed data. We will argue that Portugal’s accession
to the EC provides an excellent setting to study this issue for several reasons. First, the focus on a speciﬁc
country and policy event allows us to cleanly identify the eﬀect and carefully control for a number of factors.
Second, we expect the eﬀects of TPU to be most important for small, developing, open economies where
trade is central both to consumers and ﬁrms.5 So, Portugal’s experience in 1986 may be highly relevant for
many developing countries today seeking secure access to US and EC markets. Third, Portuguese trade
increased dramatically after 1986. As we document in section 3, that increase was largest towards the EC
partners, suggesting that it was caused by the accession. Finally, the export expansion upon accession was
characterized by considerable entry of Portuguese ﬁrms into EC markets even in industries where applied
tariﬀs did not change, which indicates the potential role for the agreement in reducing TPU. In section 3 we
show that this expansion cannot be explained by standard aggregate determinants of trade such as income
and exchange rates, which suggests they may be driven by changes in expectations about trade policies.
In section 4 we build a dynamic model to show precisely how reductions in TPU increase entry and trade.
4http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (accessed November 29, 2010)
5A large fraction of Portuguese ﬁrms are engaged in some form of international trade–about 24%–and account for a large
fraction of private sector non-agricultural employment–58% or 46% if we focus only on exporters. These ﬁgures for 1987 are
based on merged information Quadros de Pessoal and International Trade statistics available from INE.
2We derive a structural equation that relates the entry decision to current policy and a measure of TPU:
the percent loss in proﬁts due to a negative tariﬀ shock that eliminates tariﬀ preferences. In section 5 we
test and ﬁnd evidence for the entry and export predictions. We estimate that Portuguese exporters believed
there was a 39% probability of losing preferences before the agreement and zero after. So the agreement
eliminated that source of TPU. Overall, the trade policy changes accounted for a substantial share of the
observed growth in entry (61%) and export value (87%) in the data. Moreover, we perform counterfactuals
to decompose the role of applied tariﬀsv s .T P U .W eﬁnd that the applied tariﬀ changes can account only
for between 0.4-0.5 of the total policy eﬀect for Spain and 0.1-0.2 for the EC-10, so a large part of the PTA’s
eﬀect was due to the credible elimination of TPU. In this sense our results may have broader implications
for evaluating how the investment and market-entry eﬀects of other types of trade or tax policy reforms
depend on their credibility.6
In the ﬁnal section we discuss additional applications of our framework and implications of the results.
2 Related Literature
To examine the impact of policy uncertainty we focus on a dynamic model of ﬁrm investment and entry.
If entry costs are sunk and at least partially irreversible, a prospective ﬁrm must consider the time path of
other variables that aﬀect proﬁtability. Dixit (1989) shows that uncertainty about future prices creates an
option value of waiting so ﬁrms will delay investments in entry or exit until they receive more information.
In this setting, entry and exit depend on the variance of shocks, their persistence and the size of sunk
costs. Baldwin and Krugman (1989) extend these theoretical insights in a model with uncertainty about
the exchange rate and homogenous ﬁrms. They show there is a possibility for “beachhead eﬀects”: after a
ﬁrm receives a positive shock and pays the sunk cost of entry into exporting it will not immediately reverse
its investment even if the initial shock is reversed. Thus even temporary shocks can have lasting eﬀects.
There is considerable evidence that ﬁrms are heterogenous, a fact that is particularly important in
the context of international trade. Starting with Bernard and Jensen (1995) an extensive literature has
developed, which documents the fact that exporters tend to be larger and more eﬃcient than non-exporters.7
6To the extent that some PTAs are more credible than others our results can help explain recent aggregate evidence on
large impacts of some PTAs on trade ﬂows and the mixed results for others (Baier, et al. 2007).
7We can also verify this directly in our data for Portugal in the period we are interested: in 1987 the median number of
employees for all exporting ﬁrms (with at least one employee) was 28, which is 7 times larger than the median number for all
private non-agricultural ﬁrms in the economy.
3Moreover, there is evidence of self-selection into exporting: i.e. that the larger, more productive ﬁrms are
the ones that can overcome ﬁxed costs and export. A large number of recent models incorporate ﬁrm
heterogeneity and show it has important theoretical and empirical implications for trade (cf. Melitz, 2003,
and Bernard et al. 2003). Particularly important from our perspective is the fact that in this type of model
the extensive margin may dominate the response of trade ﬂows to reductions in trade barriers (as argued by
Chaney, 2008) and that the failure to control for ﬁrm heterogeneity in gravity models results in an upward
bias to aggregate estimates of trade frictions (Helpman et al., 2008). Therefore we will focus on a dynamic
model of entry into exports where ﬁrms have heterogenous productivity.
The increasing evidence of sunk costs in export-market entry (cf. Roberts and Tybout, 1997), has lead
some to consider alternative sources of uncertainty that can generate hysteresis and real option problems
in trade models. These sources of uncertainty include exchange rate, demand, productivity, and our focus,
policy uncertainty. However, most theoretical and nearly all empirical analysis of uncertainty remains
conﬁned to the impact of exchange rate volatility, about which evidence remains mixed.8 Das et al. (2007)
ﬁnd that sunk costs are quantitatively important in explaining export participation of marginal ﬁrms in
Colombia and use a structural model to show that subsidies to sunk costs could raise entry substantially
but ﬁnd limited evidence that exchange rate volatility aﬀects entry and exit. More broadly, studies of the
impact of exchange rate volatility on aggregate trade ﬂows ﬁnd that eﬀect is negative but “fairly small and
is by no means robust” (IMF, 2004, p.6).9
The impact of trade and tax policy uncertainty when there are sunk costs of investment, has received far
less attention. One diﬃculty is that most policy processes are not readily adapted to a standard stochastic
process and major regime changes may be “rare events”. This does not mean however that such “rare
events” are irrelevant for investment decisions, as recently emphasized in a diﬀerent context by Barro
(2006). Even if the fears of temporary reversal to protection or major trade wars never materialize, the
small possibility of these worst case scenarios can have measurable economic eﬀects. The scant work on this
area is largely theoretical, for example Rodrik (1991) develops a model of capital investment when ﬁrms
believe an investment tax credit reform may be reversed in the future. If the probability or cost of a policy
8Campa (2004) ﬁnds evidence of sunk costs of entry for Spanish ﬁrms but smaller than anticipated eﬀects of exchange
rate volatility. Baldwin (1988) uses aggregate data and ﬁnds that large exchange rate shocks in the 1980s may have led to
“beachhead eﬀects” but is unable to rule out alternative explanations for the ﬁndings given the aggregate nature of the data.
9Impullitti et al. (2011) incorporate evolving productivity uncertainty into a heterogeneous ﬁrms model to show that sunk
costs can generate a large number of small persistent exporters, which is consistent with having an option value of waiting to
exit. Arkolakis (2011) explains this same pattern by assuming increasing ﬁxed costs of market penetration to reach consumers
in a model without an option value of waiting to enter.
4reversal is high, a reform to promote investment may produce exactly the opposite outcome. Empirically,
Aizenman and Marion (1993) show that low persistence of monetary and ﬁscal aggregates has negative
eﬀects on investment and growth in cross-country regressions.
Trade models generally assume policy is static or assume that reforms are either fully anticipated or
unanticipated (cf. Constantini and Melitz, 2008; Burstein and Melitz, 2011). We can learn something
about the response of trade to reform in these models. But many reforms are not perceived as permanent
ex-ante or genuinely unanticipated. Moreover, the models may be calibrated to elasticities estimated under
uncertainty, which we will argue do not generally reﬂect the true impact of a reform when uncertainty is
itself changing. Our model can capture some of the extreme assumptions about anticipation of shocks as
special cases and allow for the more general and possibly realistic behavior where ﬁrms may expect a reform
but remain uncertain about its timing and magnitude.
There is an ongoing empirical debate regarding the value of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.
The impact of European Community (EC) membership on trade ﬂows, which we examine here for the case
of Portugal, is certainly no exception. Early work on the trade eﬀects of PTAs delivered mixed results, e.g.
Frankel (1997) reports small and sometimes negative eﬀects of EC membership on bilateral trade between
members in the 1960s and 1970s but positive ones in the 1980s and 1990s. Small trade eﬀects have also
been found by ex-post econometric studies of other PTAs, which seems puzzling given the ex-ante zeal of
policy makers for entering such agreements. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) argue that accounting for potential
selection into PTAs is important and ﬁnd that when this is done some of these agreements can increase
trade by as much as 100%. However, the aggregate trade impact of some PTAs remains mixed.10
In addition to self-selection there are other potential explanations for the recent ﬁndings of the large
trade impacts of some PTAs. They may be due to competitive reallocation and productivity enhancing
investments induced by trade liberalization (Constantini and Melitz, 2008; Chaney, 2005; Treﬂer, 2004).
Alternatively, PTAs may imply permanent reductions in trade frictions so future shocks to macro variables
may have larger eﬀects on expected proﬁts and this can generate entry as argued by Ruhl (2008). The
latter motive is related to the one we explore but we model the TPU channel and estimate its impact
econometrically. Much less is known about how and why trade grows following PTAs. Most empirical work
10Applied general equilibrium models often grossly under predict the response of trade ﬂows to the tariﬀ reductions in PTAs,
a challenge documented by Kehoe (2005) for the North American Free Trade Agreement. PTAs may also be valued if market
agents prefer policy stability as hypothesized by Mansﬁeld and Reinhart (2008) who also provide aggregate evidence that PTAs
reduce trade variability and increase exports.
5remains at the aggregate cross-country level and does not examine the details of PTA policy changes.11
Handley (2011) extends the model we employ to analyze not PTAs but instead the role of multilateral
policy commitments by WTO members known as tariﬀ “bindings.”12 He measures uncertainty faced by
exporters using the gap between applied and WTO bound tariﬀss e tb yA u s t r a l i aa n dﬁnds that this form
of TPU lowers both the level of product entry and the elasticity of entry to applied tariﬀ reductions. To
our knowledge there are no tests of the impact of TPU (unilateral, preferential or multilateral) on ﬁrm level
investment and entry decisions into export markets.
3 Trade Policy Uncertainty and Portugal’s European Integration
The main purpose of this section is to provide some facts and a preliminary aggregate analysis of Portugal’s
European trade integration. We ﬁrst describe some basic features of the world trading system and highlight
several sources of TPU. We then provide background information on Portugal’s preferential agreements
with various European countries. The EC accession in 1986 generated considerable aggregate export growth
towards those partners and it was characterized by the entry of new ﬁrms into those markets. We argue
that the aggregate evidence is consistent with an uncertainty-reducing role of EC accession but possibly also
with other explanations thus in section 5 we explore the ﬁrm-level predictions.
3.1 Trade Policy Uncertainty in the World Trading System
As we note in the Introduction there are good reasons to be concerned about TPU and yet very little
research on its sources and impacts. This may partly be due to the fact that trade policy is perceived not
to be very volatile; after all statutory tariﬀ rates are legislated at most on a yearly basis. However, applied
trade policy can be more volatile than what is suggested by focusing on statutory tariﬀ rates since they are
by no means the only type of protection. Limão and Tovar (2011) employ the estimates in Kee et al. (2009)
and note that the trade restrictiveness index for the typical country in the world is equivalent to a uniform
tariﬀ of 14% , but this jumps to 27% when non-tariﬀ barriers are included. Several of these NTBs are not
strictly (if at all) regulated by the WTO and even the ones that are can be used by countries, sometimes
11One exception is Evenett et al. (2004) who examine whether MFN tariﬀs are more secure than the ad-hoc preferential
duties of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). They ﬁnd inconclusive evidence for Bulgaria and Ecuador’s exports to
developed countries.
12Recent independent work by Sala et al. (2010) also studies the impact of WTO bindings on exports theoretically but not
empirically.
6on a temporary basis and for speciﬁc goods. But even temporary measures can remain in place for months
or years.13
The ability to use unregulated policy instruments can interact with macroeconomic or political shocks to
generate considerable uncertainty. For example, there was widespread fear that the recent economic down-
turn would result in a substantial increase in protectionism. This included the possibility of anti-dumping
measures; increases in developing country tariﬀs from their applied level to the maximum allowed under
international agreements; and the use of government procurement measures such as the “buy-American”
provision attached to the US stimulus bill. Even though the worst fears of a trade war were not realized,
the real possibility of the outcome created uncertainty. Our model illustrates how these fears can aﬀect
investment and exporting decisions.
Turning to more permanent sources of TPU a number of examples stand out: ﬁrst, concerns with product
quality and safety raise the possibility that certain products may be completely banned from a market, e.g.
genetically modiﬁed foods in the EU; second, the US threat of import duties to counter Chinese currency
“manipulation”; third, the possibility of using “environmental” duties at the border to oﬀset diﬀerences in
carbon emissions in production. Again we stress that even if these policies remain only a remote possibility,
the fact that if they materialize they would be signiﬁcant and possibly permanent can have important
impacts in current investment and export decisions. It is conceivable that these eﬀects could be larger than
temporary exchange rate movements that may be hedged against.
One measure of governments’ concern with this source of policy uncertainty are their attempts to negoti-
ate trade agreements. One of the central reasons for the formation of the GATT was the desire to avoid the
disastrous tariﬀ wars in the 1930’s, which shut down many markets to exporters. Reductions in applied pro-
tection after 1945 were small, but Irwin (1994) suggests the credibility of the GATT regime may have played
a role in the trade and economic growth of post-war western Europe. To this day the GATT’s successor,
the WTO, lists as one of its functions and principles: “Predictability through bindings and transparency
[to] promote investment and allow(s) consumers to fully enjoy the beneﬁts of competition.” (www.wto.org)
and we will see that these channels will be central in our model.
However, multilateral agreements are themselves uncertain in terms of timing, negotiation outcomes and
13For example, in June 2001 the US started an investigation that eventually lead to the steel safeguards of about 30% in
March of 2002. These duties remained in place for almost 20 months and were only removed after a negative ruling from the
WTO. Foreign exporters of steel were not compensated for this loss. More generally, Grinols and Perrelli (2006) report that
the typical U.S. dispute under the WTO lasts about 18 months with a large standard deviation of about 10 months. Another
example of NTBs is anti-dumping duties, which can be punitive.
7implementation. Successive rounds of trade negotiations have repeatedly failed and later been resurrected.
For example, an aborted attempt was made to start the Uruguay Round in 1982 and negotiations only
restarted in 1986. After that round, attempts to start a new round failed at Seattle in 1999. Moreover, each
successive round has taken longer to complete than the previous. The Uruguay Round took over 7 years
to complete, twice as long as expected, and the Doha Round was launched in 2001 and nine years later it
is still unresolved. Even when an agreement is successfully concluded the implementation takes some time,
disputes arise and not all policies are covered.
Moreover, multilateral agreements do not regulate all types of trade policy. This can generate uncertainty
in periods of crisis, as discussed above, but also in quieter times. To see why note that currently two ﬁrms
exporting a similar product to the same market may face very diﬀerent policy barriers. While the tariﬀs
that countries negotiate multilaterally must be available to all WTO members, this so called Most-Favoured-
Nation (MFN) tariﬀ is in practice often the policy faced by the “least-favoured-nation”. The reason is the
myriad of preference schemes available. These include not only the standard PTAs but also unilateral
preferences the US, EU and several other developed countries extend to developing nations, e.g. through
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). These preferences generate uncertainty for the “least-favoured-
nations” whose ﬁrms don’t know if they will face more competition from ﬁrms that receive preferences and
also become less certain of any future multilateral tariﬀ reductions14.
Unilateral preference schemes, such as the GSP, are also extremely uncertain for the recipients themselves.
These preferences are often conditional not only on trade but also non-trade related criteria that can and have
triggered non-renewal for speciﬁcc o u n t r i e s . 15 This is one reason why recipients of such unilateral preferences
try to negotiate more permanent arrangements even if that requires them to open up their markets. For
example, Peru and Colombia received unilateral preferences along with other Andean countries through
the ATPA and then sought FTAs with the US to secure permanent preferential access. A USITC report
describes the issue as follows
“The probable future eﬀects of ATPA are likely to be minimal, as investor uncertainty over
ATPA renewal and concerns about the impact of recently negotiated U.S. bilateral FTAs with
Colombia and Peru have dampened regional interest in investment to produce ATPA-eligible
14Limão (2006) and Karacaovali and Limão (2008) ﬁnd that preferences provided by the US and EU respectively caused
them to maintain relatively higher multilateral tariﬀs against the rest of the world in the Uruguay Round. Estevadeordal et al
(2008) ﬁnd that PTAs within Latin America generated reductions in external tariﬀsi nt h o s eL a t i nA m e r i c a nc o u n t r i e s .
15During the period 1993-2008, the United States allowed the GSP to expire seven times for periods lasting from two to
fourteen months (Jones, 2008).
8exports, particularly in Bolivia and Ecuador. (p. ix)” (USITC, 2008)
As just noted, preferences tend to be more secure when they are part of a formal and reciprocal preferen-
tial trade agreement (PTAs). There are currently hundreds of such arrangements reﬂecting both trade and
non-trade motives (Limão, 2007). Potential trade beneﬁts include not only guaranteeing access to speciﬁc
markets to secure pre-existing unilateral preferences (as described for US-Colombia, and as we will argue
for Portugal’s EC accession) but also to insure (i) against some forms of protection in that country (e.g.
U.S. PTA partners were exempt from the steel safeguards) or (ii) against a trade war breaking out in the
rest of the world (Perroni and Whalley, 2000). But even the best laid plans to move forward on regional
and bilateral arrangements are fraught with uncertainty. Plans for an FTA of the Americas began in the
1990s and have been abandoned. The US signed FTAs with Korea and Colombia that awaited ratiﬁcation
years after the main negotiations ended. Several Eastern European countries had preferential market access
to the EU before securing those preferences more permanently as EU members. Moreover, there is still a
long list of candidates that have begun or await negotiations to join the EU. Similar issues have aﬀected
accessions to the European Market: the United Kingdom was initially vetoed for membership in the 1960s,
but later joined the club in 1972; Turkey has been in negotiations for over 20 years; and Portugal’s road to
full membership was also long and fraught with uncertainty, as we now describe.
3.2 Portugal’s European Trade Integration
3.2.1 Background and Stylized Facts
Portugal’s market access to its European partners in the 1970s and early 80s displayed many of the same
characteristics associated with uncertainty outlined above. Prior to joining the European Community (EC),
Portugal was a founding member of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), which was signed in 1960. By
the late 1960s, EFTA had achieved free trade in industrial products. When the UK and Denmark left EFTA
in 1972 to joint the EC, the remaining EFTA countries (including Portugal) signed bilateral agreements with
the EC that implemented free trade in industrial products by 1977.
Portugal’s trade with neighboring Spain remained highly restricted until the EFTA-Spain agreement of
1980. This agreement began a partial liberalization of Spain’s tariﬀs against the EFTA countries. In the
ﬁrst phase from 1980-1983, a three tiered system of reductions on industrial products would reduce tariﬀs
9by 25% to 60% with EFTA partners. Portugal was granted even greater reductions of up to 80%.16
A second phase of reductions over a period of indeterminate length was supposed to commence in 1984.
The EFTA-Spain agreement contained no deﬁnite timetable or scheduled reductions for the second phase
and was thus potentially incompatible with GATT Article XXIV’s requirement that PTAs implement zero
tariﬀs on substantially all trade. This uncertainty about the elimination of tariﬀs is clear from a GATT
report where one of its members noted that the EFTA-Spain agreement
“provided only an expectation that at some point in time the duties and other regulations
of commerce would be eliminated but no speciﬁc provisions existed in this respect. There was a
great diﬀerence between an expectation and a speciﬁc plan and schedule”.17
T h es a m ed o c u m e n tn o t e sthat subsequent notiﬁcations to the GATT show that the preferential reduc-
tions between Spain and EFTA in place by 1983 were simply extended and then renewed multiple times by
an oversight committee.
By 1984 both Spain and Portugal were in protracted negotiations for accession to the EC. The Articles
of Accession to the EC required another round of tariﬀ reductions between Portugal, Spain and the EC-10
countries and harmonization with the EC Common Customs Tariﬀ (CCT). The agreement was signed in the
middle of 1985 and the accession entered into force on March 1, 1986. Protocol 3 of the Acts of Accession
required Spain to fully liberalize industrial tariﬀs against Portugal immediately to harmonize with the
preferences already granted by the existing EC-10 countries to Portugal. Spain’s agricultural tariﬀsw e r e
reduced by 12.5% per year, with respect to Portugal and the EC-10, to achieve free trade in most products
by 1993. Some non-tariﬀ measures and quantitative restrictions would be fully or partially liberalized only
by 1996. Both Spain and Portugal would implement the external CCT either (i) immediately if the national
tariﬀ was within 15 percentage points of the CCT or (ii) by 1993 for products where the initial tariﬀ was
outside this range. The EC-10 countries phased in full liberalization by 1992 of agricultural tariﬀs against
Portugal at 14.3% per year.
Before modelling and estimating the impact of uncertainty it is useful to examine the broader impacts
of these preferences on Portugal’s trade and investment in exporting. During the 1950’s and 60’s Portugal
16Details of the reductions can be found in the text of the “Agreement Between the EFTA Countries and Spain,” signed May
26, 1979 and entering into force on May 1, 1980. Annex P contains the timetable and list products with tariﬀ reduction for
Spain and Portugal. GATT notiﬁcations indicate that these scheduled reductions were implemented as planned (“Agreement
Between the EFTA Countries and Spain, Information Furnished by Parties to the Agreement" L/5465, March 8, 1983).
17“Agreement between the EFTA countries and Spain”, Report of the Working Party," L/5405, October 24, 1980, p.3
10was relatively closed to trade; its goods trade/GDP ratio averaged only about 30% going above 40% in the
1970’s and 50% in the 1980’s.18 Between 1985 and 1992 real exports grew by 90% and imports by about
300%.19 The fraction of ﬁrms involved in trade went from 22% in 1986 to 26% in 1992 and employment in
ﬁrms that trade increased by about 200,000.20
The historical impact of European preferential agreements on Portugal’s aggregate trade/GDP ratio is
sometimes clear, e.g. imports/GDP rose rapidly upon EC accession, but not always. What seems clear
is that these agreements had a strong eﬀect on the trade orientation towards preferential partners. The
trade share with EFTA countries increased from about 20% in 1960 to 30% in 1973, as shown in Figure 1.21
The ﬁgure also reveals that the termination of agreements is important. The exit of Denmark and the UK
(which accounted for half of Portugal’s trade with EFTA) to join the EC in 1973 initiated a rapid decline
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1960: EFTA signed; 1972: EFTA-EC agree FTA; UK/DK exit EFTA
Portuguese Trade Shares with original EFTA countries
Figure 1
18The 2006 ratio is from Bank of Portugal online statistics. The historical ratios for trade in goods are calculated from
current price data in Pinheiro et al (1997).
19Authors’ calculations based on data from Pinheiro et al (1997)
20Authors’s calculation from merged information of Quadros de Pessoal and International Trade statistics from INE.
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Figure 2 shows the re-orientation of Portugal’s trade with its EC preferential partners starting in 1985.
The share with the EC-10 and Spain goes up from 52% in 1985 to 72% in 1992. If we exclude Spain we still
ﬁnd that the trade share with EC-10 went from 47% to 57% over that period. The other interesting point is
that the initial preferential agreement between the EC and Portugal (agreed in 1972, fully implemented by
1977) and Spain and Portugal (early 1980’s) left their trade share nearly unchanged at about 50% between
1972 and 1985.22 The strong increase in trade shares with the EC after 1985 was not merely a switch away
from exporting to other markets. There is strong evidence of trade creation: total real exports in 1993 were
almost twice as high as in 1985 (Pinheiro et al., 1997).
Starting in 1981 we have access to data from the Portuguese census (INE) that, to our knowledge, has
never been analyzed for this period: international trade by Portuguese ﬁrms at the transaction level. This
allows us to examine whether the source of the growth in trade is related to ﬁrms entering the preferential
markets. To determine if net entry is diﬀerentially larger for preferential markets we contrast it to the growth
in the number of ﬁrms exporting to large non-preferential markets such as the U.S. As the dotted line in
Figure 3 shows there was positive and rather substantial net entry of exporting ﬁrms into the US between
1981 and 1985 but almost none between 1985 and 1992. In contrast to this, the number of Portuguese ﬁrms
exporting to Germany (dashed line) grew by 65 log points between 1985 and 1992.23 Entry into the Spanish
market was even more pronounced, over 150 log points in the 1985-1992 period with an apparent upward
22We can detect more of an eﬀect during this period if we focus on Portuguese export shares alone, which go from 50% to
62% in this 13 year period. But export growth is faster after the 1986 accession and the EC share in Portugal exports goes up
to 73% in only 7 years.
23Other important Portuguese preferential markets such as the UK displayed a similar trend to Germany, as did France but
the latter exhibiting faster growth post-1985.
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3.2.2 Aggregate Evidence of EC Impact on Portuguese Exports and Entry
We now provide evidence that the increase in Portuguese exports and number of ﬁrms towards the EC after
accession cannot be fully explained by standard determinants. We also ﬁnd the accession has a quantitatively
important eﬀect on the extensive margin (number of ﬁrms) and this translated into signiﬁcant aggregate
export increases. The main objective of these and other ﬁndings we discuss in this section (and in further
detail in the appendix section B.4) is not to test a speciﬁc channel by which accession worked. We seek to
gauge the aggregate importance of accession and help motivate the model we develop to provide detailed
predictions on the channels linking accession to trade and investment, which we test in section 5.
The EC accession was not the only notable economic event Portugal experienced in the 1980’s. Earlier, in
August 1983, Portugal completed an agreement with the IMF to help it resolve a balance of payment crisis.
The nominal Portuguese exchange rate continued to depreciate against the major European currencies until
1990, but starting in 1985 it experienced some appreciation relative to the US dollar.25 To account for this
and other eﬀects, e.g. changes in incomes and prices, we can estimate an aggregate gravity equation for
Portuguese exports. This is by now a standard tool to estimate the impact of PTAs on aggregate trade
ﬂows. To account for the potential endogeneity of PTAs (e.g. because they may be more common between
countries that already trade more) we include bilateral ﬁxed eﬀects. These also account for other time
24Our analysis here stops in 1992 for two reasons. First, as discussed above this was the end of the initial period accession.
Second, there was a major change in the data collection procedures in 1993 due to the removal of physical customs barriers
within the EC. The new system, Intrastat, is based on self-reporting and has minimum export value thresholds, both of which
imply that the number of ﬁrms in the data in 1993 exhibits a discrete fall that aﬀects only EC partners.
25The aggregate real exchange rate did not exhibit large changes between 1980-1991 according to the IMF IFS statistics.
13invariant diﬀerences in Portuguese exports to each of its partners (distance, colonial ties, etc.).26 We also
include year eﬀects to control among other things for Portuguese productivity and price changes (since we
use nominal export values). Moreover, we control for bilateral nominal exchange rates, price deﬂators in the
import country and their real GDP. By interacting an EC accession time dummy (=1 for 1986 and subsequent
years) with the member country dummies (Spain or EC-10) we can then test if Portuguese exports to these
preferential markets grew diﬀerentially relative to the rest of the world. To avoid confounding the trade
policy eﬀects of accession with other possible motives why accession may have increased trade, as discussed
below, we end our sample in 1990.
The results in the ﬁrst column of Table 1 show an increase of 23 log points towards the EC-10 in the
post-accession period that cannot be accounted for by the standard determinants. That increase is 5 times
larger for Spain. Given our interest in the role of investment and entry we also go beyond the standard
gravity estimation and use the (ln) number of ﬁrms as a dependent variable.27 Those results, in the second
column of Table 1, show that the pattern in the previous graphs cannot be explained by aggregate income,
exchange rate or price indices: the number of ﬁrms exporting to Spain and the EC-10 was signiﬁcantly
higher than to other countries after accession.
While our objective in this section is not to determine the channel by which accession worked, we can
nonetheless argue against two potentially important alternatives: monetary integration and infrastructure
investments. It is unlikely that the estimated accession eﬀe c ti sd u et oe x c h a n g er a t ee ﬀects or the prospect
of a monetary union for two reasons. First, the sample we use ends in 1990–two years before the signing
of the Maastricht Treaty setting out the timetable for the Euro and nine years before the national exchange
rates were irrevocably ﬁxed. Second, if accession aﬀected exchange rates then these eﬀects are controlled for
by including its level (as we do in the baseline results) and its volatility, which we also did and found did
not aﬀect the accession coeﬃcients.28 Portugal received substantial EC support for transport infrastructure.
But this funding only started in 1989 so it could at most have started to reduce trade costs in 1990 and
thus can’t explain the large trade increases before then.29
26The use of bilateral ﬁxed eﬀects as a way to address PTA endogeneity is argued by Baier and Bergstrand (2007). In our
setting these reduce to importer ﬁxed eﬀects since the only exporter in the data is Portugal.
27Our model will provide a formal justiﬁcation for using this dependent variable in a gravity regression. Bernard et al. (2007)
present similar type speciﬁcations for the U.S.
28These results are available on request. The estimated trade elasticities to volatility is negative but quantitatively inconse-
quential. For a recent review of the academic literature see IMF (2004). The measure we use is the one the report cites as the
preferred one: log(standard deviation of monthly exchange rate changes).
29Pereira and Andraz (2005) report that public investment in transport infrastructure was identical (as a share of GDP) in
1981-85 and 1986-1988 (1.3%) and increased only after EC funds started: to 1.8% on average between 1989-93 and 2.2% in
1994-98.
14We conclude by discussing more speciﬁc ﬁndings; some of these guide our subsequent modelling assump-
tions and others are consistent with the predictions resulting from that model. First, we note that the
typical new exporter to a given market (deﬁned as a ﬁrm exporting to a country at  but not −1) is smaller
than a continuing ﬁrm (about 6 times smaller for Spain and 20 times for the EC-10). This is one reason
why we focus on a model of heterogenous ﬁrms with ﬁxed costs of entry. Moreover, this size heterogeneity
implies that if accession had increased the number of entrants but not the average sales of continuing ﬁrms
then we should observe a reduction in average sales per ﬁrm as we ﬁnd for the EC-10 in column 3 of Table 1.
These eﬀects are consistent with a model, such as the one we develop, where reductions in policy uncertainty
increase entry but have little eﬀect on the current sales of existing ﬁrms provided that applied policy does
not change much, as was the case with EC-10.30
One of the central objectives of the paper is to determine the relative importance of applied vs. expected
policy on the number of ﬁrms in a market. Analyzing this issue is particularly interesting if policy changes
have large eﬀects on the number of ﬁrms and this translates into signiﬁcant new investment and aggregate
exports. As the results in column 2 show the accession lead to a large additional number of ﬁrms. Moreover,
in the appendix we ﬁnd evidence that this increase mainly reﬂects new entrants (as opposed to fewer exits)
and thus is likely to have required considerable entry investments. It would be simple to see that new
entrants also generated considerable export growth if we knew accession had not aﬀected the exports of
continuing ﬁrms. In that case column 1 of Table 1 would reﬂect only entrants’ exports but otherwise that
is an upper bound on the role of entrants on aggregate exports. In the appendix, we provide evidence that
even though entrants are smaller they had a signiﬁcant impact on aggregate exports. First, the raw data
shows that entrants (those that did not export just before the agreement was implemented but did so shortly
thereafter) account for a substantial share of export growth between 1986 and 1990 (over 54% for Spain
and 73% for the EC). Second, we employ a gravity approach to predict the eﬀect of accession for diﬀerent
subsets of ﬁrms and ﬁnd that about 30% of the predicted increase in exports is accounted for by new ﬁrms.
In sum, there is strong evidence of an increase in the number of Portuguese ﬁrms and aggregate exports
towards EC-10 and Spain following accession that can’t be explained by standard determinants. Given
that Portuguese exporters already enjoyed some trade preferences in Spain and zero tariﬀsi nt h eE C - 1 0( o n
manufacturing) these impacts of accession seem puzzling. The model in the next section provides a potential
explanation — the agreement removed policy uncertainty faced by exporters — and shows how to test it.
30Average exports by ﬁrm to Spain remained unchanged but this is still consistent with the model since Spanish applied
protection fell, thus increasing average sales of continuing ﬁrms.
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We now model the impact of policy uncertainty on ﬁrms’l investment and export entry decisions. First, we
determine the optimal demand, supply, pricing and proﬁts for each ﬁrm conditional on exporting. Second,
we examine its decision to invest to enter that market and how it is aﬀected by policy uncertainty.
4.1 Demand, Supply and Pricing
The utility function of the representative consumer,  = 
1−
0 , is identical across countries and deﬁned
over a numeraire good, denoted by 0, which is homogenous and freely traded on world markets, and a
subutility index, ,d e ﬁned over diﬀerentiated goods with constant expenditure share .W e c o n s i d e r a
CES aggregator over a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods, indexed by ,f r o mt h es e tΩ of available goods
For simplicity of exposition we focus on a symmetric structure with common elasticity of substitution,








Each country  has aggregate income equal to  and consumers in  face prices  so their optimal demand














is the CES price index. The consumer price, , includes any existing
trade costs. We focus on ad valorem import tariﬀs and note that they are generally not ﬁrm speciﬁc but
rather product or industry speciﬁc, and denote the tariﬀ factor that  sets on the group of products  by
 ≥ 1 , so free trade is represented by  =1 . Therefore, producers of any  ∈  receive  where
 will be unity if the good is produced and sold in  ( i . e .w ea s s u m en od o m e s t i cs a l e st a x e s ) .
We ﬁrst determine the optimal price and operating proﬁts for each monopolistically competitive ﬁrm
conditional on supplying a market. The marginal cost parameter, , is constant and heterogenous across
ﬁrms. We can interpret 1 as either labor productivity or the productivity of an input bundle, so given a
wage, ,i nt h ee x p o r t i n gc o u n t r y,t h eﬁrms’ marginal cost is . Since our analysis focuses on ﬁrms
31We can show that most theoretical and empirical results can be easily extended to a multi-sector structure that allows for
diﬀerent elasticities of substitution within each sector and across sectors. For example,  could instead be a Cobb-Douglas
aggregator across  sectors, each representing a distinct CES aggregate, as we consider in the empirical robustness section.
16in a particular exporting country we drop the “” subscript.
In a deterministic setting the ﬁrm simply chooses prices (or quantities) to maximize operating proﬁts in
each period,  =(  − ), leading to the standard mark-up rule over cost,  = ,a n dt h e
consumer faces this price augmented by any import tariﬀ in that industry.
 =( ) (3)
Under uncertainty we need to be clear about the timing of the ﬁrm’s production and pricing decisions.
We allow the ﬁrm to make all its production and pricing decisions after the policy and thus demand are
known, so only its investment decision will be made under uncertainty.32 This production ﬂexibility has
two basic implications. First, the pricing decision is exactly the same as above. Second, we are making
the ﬁrms less averse to policy risk, e.g. to variability in tariﬀs, after they enter the market since they can
optimally adjust to shocks and their operating proﬁts are convex in the policy. To clearly see the last point
we substitute the optimal price into demand to calculate revenue received by the producer
 =(  )−1−
  ()
1− (4)
We can see that, all else equal, the export values for a ﬁrm that has entered a market are directly aﬀected
only by the current applied policy–there is no direct eﬀect of uncertainty. This occurs because production
occurs after the uncertainty is resolved. Therefore the direct impact of uncertainty on individual ﬁrms in
our model will arise via the investment/entry margin rather than the intensive margin.33
Substituting revenues into the operating proﬁt expression and simplifying we obtain
 =(  )−1−
  (5)
where  ≡ (1 − ) ()
1−, summarizes aggregate conditions, e.g. domestic wage, ,a n df o r e i g n
32If we were focusing on uncertainty surrounding a variable with high frequency variation it may be reasonable to consider
production, and possibly pricing, decisions undertaken prior to the realization of the state of foreign demand. But since we
are focusing on trade policy, which changes at low frequency, we don’t think that is the most relevant friction to focus on in
analyzing the impact of uncertainty.
33In practice, a reduction in uncertainty could aﬀect the intensive margin if it triggered technology upgrading for example.
In related work we show how to incorporate this eﬀect without qualitatively aﬀecting the market entry investment decisions
that we focus on here. Uncertainty can also aﬀect the intensive margin indirectly if the resulting change in the number of
exporting ﬁr m si ss u ﬃciently large to aﬀect the price index. In the empirical application we consider the exporter is small so
this eﬀect is negligible (and addressed econometrically), therefore we also abstract from this indirect eﬀect in the model.
17demand.34 In general, we can allow for stochastic innovations to  that are independent of innovations to
tariﬀs. We control for such dynamics in the empirical section, but we do not model them here.
4.2 Firm Value, Investment and Export Entry Setup
We focus on how foreign TPU aﬀects the decision to enter export markets. Therefore, we assume there are
no ﬁxed costs to enter or produce in the domestic market (as in Helpman et al., 2008). As such, for each
industry  there exists a mass of ﬁrms in the exporting country equal to  ; all of which produce for their
home market but only a subset of them, to be determined, will export to any given market.35 As we noted
above, these ﬁrms are heterogeneous only in terms of their productivity, which has a cumulative distribution
function  (1) that is strictly increasing.
To serve a foreign market a ﬁrm must ﬁrst make a ﬁx e dc o s ti n v e s t m e n tt h a ti ss u n k . A sn o t e di n
section 2 there is evidence that these investments can be large when it comes to serving foreign markets.
To understand the basic eﬀect of these costs consider ﬁrst a deterministic environment where proﬁts are
constant. A ﬁrm considering entering a new export market invests and enters if the present discounted value




We allow this investment to be destination market and possibly industry-speciﬁci nt h a tﬁrms producing
 ∈  all face the same cost, but this cost may diﬀer for another industry. In a purely deterministic
environment, the discount factor  reﬂects only the “true” discount rate , but it is straightforward to show
that the expression above also applies when operating proﬁts are constant but there is an exogenous “exit”
probability, ,i nw h i c hc a s e =( 1−)(1+).T h i sd e ﬁnes a zero proﬁtc u t o ﬀ for unit costs as a function









34We are ignoring exchange rates but these can be incorporated and would simply entail redeﬁning  to include a multiplica-
tive eﬀect 
 . Since this variable does not vary across product it will not have a ﬁrst order eﬀect in our empirical results and
thus we do not include it here. Future work may consider interactions in uncertainty processes between tariﬀsa n de x c h a n g e
rates and try to estimate those second order eﬀects.
35This simpliﬁcation does not aﬀect our basic empirical results since, as we will see, our identiﬁcation approach controls for
industry-time eﬀects and thus accounts for domestic entry into any particular industry.
18Clearly tariﬀ reductions induce entry since they increase demand and thus allow the ﬁxed cost investment
t ob ec o v e r e de v e nb yﬁrms that are less productive. The elasticity of the cutoﬀ to a once-and-for-all change
in  is lnln = − 
−1. It is also clear that the cutoﬀ is common to all ﬁrms that face a similar tariﬀ
and ﬁxed cost, so for  ∈  all ﬁrms with    ( ) enter. The marginal entrant is the least productive
and thus smallest, which is consistent with the ﬁnding that new exporters are smaller than incumbents.36
As we discuss in section 3 there are several potential sources of TPU that exporters face. Moreover,
potential exporters can optimally choose not just whether to invest but when to do so. Therefore ongoing
policy uncertainty generates an option value of waiting, which can have important eﬀects for investment.
The analysis below applies for each ﬁrm in an export country  that is considering the decision to invest to
enter in market  and sell some good  so we drop these subscripts for simplicity.
Formally, the ﬁrm’s decision to enter an export market is modeled as an optimal stopping problem.37
Firms can be divided into exporters and non-exporters. The value of being an exporter is denoted by Π and
such a ﬁrm exits only when hit by a “death” shock since it has no other ﬁxed costs after it enters.38 Non-
exporters enter a foreign market only when the value of exporting net of the sunk entry costs, , exceeds
the option value of waiting, Π. The value of this option in our model arises because in the following period
conditions may improve and so the ﬁrm may be better oﬀ waiting until that occurs and then entering. The
investment and entry decision rule for each ﬁrm, identiﬁed by its unit cost requirement ,c a nb ed e ﬁned as
af u n c t i o no fat h r e s h o l dt a r i ﬀ ¯  that makes it indiﬀerent between entry and waiting.
Π(¯ ) −  = Π(¯ ) (8)
So, any tariﬀ  ≤ ¯  () triggers entry by any ﬁrm with cost . To determine this export cutoﬀ and the
impact of policy uncertainty we now describe the policy process and deﬁne these value functions.
Trade policy is aﬀected by several factors: economic, political, unilateral, bilateral, etc. From the
perspective of most individual ﬁrms, TPU in foreign markets may be taken as given.39 T h e r e f o r ew ed o
36The cutoﬀ elasticity with respect to tariﬀs exceeds unity because the tariﬀ is not paid by the exporter, so proﬁti n c r e a s e s
more rapidly in the tariﬀ than in the cost, as seen in (5).
37Formally, our approach is similar to Baldwin and Krugman (1989) with some key diﬀerences. First, we focus on trade
policy, which as we describe below has a diﬀerent stochastic process and is more permanent than exchange rates. Second,
they focus on homogenous ﬁrms whereas we incorporate ﬁrm heterogeneity, which allows us to analyze the eﬀect of policy
uncertainty both between and within industries that already have some export participation.
38While the assumption of no per period ﬁxed costs of exporting may seem extreme, Das et al. (2007) ﬁnd these per period
ﬁxed costs are negligible, on average, across all sectors analyzed in their structural model of Colombian exporters.
39An interesting topic for future research is to examine endogenous choice of uncertainty levels by countries and the role of
industry lobbies.
19not explicitly model the source of these shocks but simply posit that they can arise due to changes in
political pressure by interest groups, by the initiation, conclusion or breakdown of trade agreements, by
macroeconomic shocks, etc. So trade policy is summarized by a random variable with two components: the
timing of policy changes and the magnitude of those changes when they arrive.
More speciﬁcally, we model policy shocks as a Poisson process with arrival rate .40 We will generally
think of these as aggregate shocks (e.g. a new agreement, arrival of a new government with diﬀerent policy
preferences, etc.). When a shock arrives, a policy maker reconsiders the current policy and sets a new one
denoted 0. Even though the outcome of policy changes is unknown ex-ante, ﬁrms can form expectations
over future policies. We assume they do so based on their belief of  and a probability measure of tariﬀ
outcomes, (0), with support 0 ∈ [1] ,w h e r e is the worst case scenario. We assume that both 
and  are similar across ﬁrms in a given industry  so that entry decisions will depend only on a ﬁrms’
productivity relative to a cutoﬀ rather than informational asymmetries. In general we can allow  to
diﬀer across industries in order to captures the possibility that after a shock, e.g. a trade agreement, some
products will be expected to experience larger policy changes than others.
This process implies a “long-run” mean policy, which in the limit is solely determined by the mean of
the distribution  (0). Therefore a government that announces a current policy equal to  will not have
any impact on the long-run expected policy unless they can also convince the producers that either (i) this
policy is now permanent, i.e. that  =0 , or (ii) that the underlying distribution of all future policies, ,
has somehow changed. We show the resulting lack of credibility, captured by , lowers the value of current
tariﬀ reductions and thus their eﬀectiveness in generating investment in foreign markets. Therefore our goal
is to contrast the eﬀect of changes in current policies at diﬀerent  with the eﬀect of changing  itself where
we will argue that certain agreements work precisely because they successfully reduce the current tariﬀ and
make that reduction credible, i.e. they also lower or eliminate .S i n c e  captures the probability that
current policy will change we will simply refer to it as policy uncertainty.41
40Similar Poisson arrival processes for policy shocks are used by Rodrik (1991), Aizenman and Marion (1993) and Hassett
and Metcalf (1999).
41Technically, 1 −  captures the degree of persistence of tariﬀ policy but  clearly also aﬀects short term policy variance,
e.g. if  =0the variance is zero and if the current policy is at the long-run mean then  (+1)=(0).
204.3 Value of Credible vs. “Incredible” Policies
The prospective exporter’s decision to enter or wait given the current trade policy  depends on a set of
value functions, which we now derive. We then solve for the equilibrium value of exporting to examine the
value of credible vs. “incredible” (i.e. non-credible) policy changes. Since the value functions apply for each
ﬁrm with cost subscript , we omit this to simplify the notation.








which includes current operating proﬁts upon entering and the discounted future value. With probability
1 − , there is no policy shock and the ﬁrm value next period is still Π(). With probability , a policy
shock arrives changing the policy to some value, 0, and so the third term is the ex-ante expected value of
exporting following a shock, which is given by
EΠ(0)=E(0)+EΠ(0) (10)
Note that EΠ(0)=E(0)(1 − ), which is time invariant and simpliﬁes the analysis.42 Note however
that the conditional mean of the tariﬀ and value of exporting, Π() , still vary over time since they depend
on the current tariﬀ.
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A non-exporter at time  receives zero proﬁts from it today. In the following period the continuation value
is still Π() if no policy shock arrives (the ﬁrst term) or if the shock still entails a tariﬀ above the trigger
(the second term). If a policy shock arrives, it will be below ¯  with probability (¯ ) and the ﬁrm will ﬁnd
it optimal to pay  and transition to the exporting state. The conditional expected value of exporting if
42The reason is simple: the distribution of future tariﬀs, (0), is time invariant so even if there is a new tariﬀ at  +1this
provides no additional information at time  about future tariﬀs.
21 ≤ ¯  in the last term is given by
EΠ (0 | 0 ≤ ¯ )=E (0 | 0 ≤ ¯ )+ [(1 − )EΠ (0 | 0 ≤ ¯ )+EΠ(0)] (12)
This equation is structurally the same as (9). The key diﬀerence is that proﬁt ﬂows are evaluated ex-ante at
the conditional expected value of exporting for a ﬁrm that enters following a more favorable policy shock.
The set of four equations (9), (10), (11) and (12) is linear in four unknowns: Π(), EΠ(0), Π()
and EΠ (0 | 0 ≤ ¯ ). Thus we can solve explicitly for the value exporting and waiting at the current tariﬀ
for a ﬁrm that has a threshold tariﬀ ¯ ().W es t i l lo m i t from () for notational simplicity.43
Π()=
()
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if   ¯ () (14)
The interpretation of Π() is straightforward: after investment, the value of exporting conditional
on  equals the discounted value of expected proﬁts. If  were zero this would be the deterministic value
()(1 − ). But with a probability 0 t h ep o l i c yw i l lc h a n g ea n dt h ee n s u i n gp e rp e r i o de x p e c t e d
proﬁts are E(0). If the current tariﬀ is above a given ﬁrm’s trigger,   ¯ (),t h e ni td o e sn o te x p o r t
today and its value, Π(), would be zero if the tariﬀ remained above that trigger, but with some probability
(¯ ) the tariﬀ will fall below the trigger and so the ﬁrm will incur  and export. The expected value of
exporting is then captured by the remaining terms in curly brackets, which are similar to those in Π except
we must use E(0 | 0 ≤¯ ) instead of ().
We can now ask what is the value for an exporter of alternative policy changes. Consider ﬁrst a situation
where governments announce that the current tariﬀ is being reduced. We will call this a credible policy
change or agreement if the exporters expect it to remain in place, i.e. if  =0 . We will call it an “incredible”
agreement otherwise, i.e. if it is expected to be revised with probability 0.T h eﬁrst basic point is that


















43The expression for EΠ (0 | 0 ≤ ¯ ) is given in the appendix.
22This complementarity between reductions in current tariﬀs and uncertainty suggests one reason why some
PTAs may not succeed in expanding trade by much: they reduce only applied tariﬀs but not uncertainty.
In the empirical section we will quantify this eﬀect and show its potential importance.
The second point, which is related to the ﬁrst, is that even if the initial agreement is “incredible” so
  0, and it has been in place for some time there may still be considerable value to making it credible,
i.e. of having  =0 . In these cases the primary impact of a formal agreement may simply be to eliminate
uncertainty. When the tariﬀ in the initially incredible agreement is low, e.g. if  =1 , the reduction of
uncertainty increases the value of exporting as shown by this expression
Π( =1   =0 )− Π( =1    0) =
 (1) − E(0)
1 − 

1 − (1 − )
 0 (16)
This expression captures the value of moving from free trade regime of unknown duration to permanent free
trade by lowering the expected future level of tariﬀs.
This provides one motive why the recipients of unilateral preferential tariﬀs spend considerable resources
in attempting to make them permanent through formal PTAs. Examples include GSP preferences provided
by most developed countries as well as European and US special preferences to developing countries. Since
the EC-10 and Spain’s preferences toward Portugal prior to 1986 were uncertain, this change in value
captures one of the important channels by which entry into the EC beneﬁted Portuguese exporters. To
determine if uncertainty reduction was an important factor we now examine the predictions of the model
for investment and entry into foreign markets, which we will then estimate.
4.4 Policy Impacts on Investment and Entry
Using (14), (13) and the expression in (8) we can determine the threshold tariﬀ that would leave any given
ﬁrm with costs  indiﬀerent between starting to export or waiting. From an empirical perspective it will be
more useful to recast this in a diﬀerent way and ask what ﬁrms will invest and enter at any given current
tariﬀ. W eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tﬁrms can be ranked by their productivity (the inverse of unit costs 1)
according to a strictly increasing CDF. Therefore, for any current tariﬀ ,w ec a nd e t e r m i n eac u t o ﬀ cost







A ﬁrm with costs equal to 
 is indiﬀerent between investing today and starting to export or waiting.
As will be clear that will also be true this period for all ﬁrms with lower costs if they had not yet started
23to export. The model has a closed form expression for 
 in terms of the current tariﬀ.F i r s t ,w es e tt h e















 ) − E( |  ≤  
 )]
1 − (1 − )
(17)
Entry requires that the ﬁxed cost does not exceed the sum of the three terms on the RHS, each of which
has an intuitive explanation for the marginal entrant. The ﬁrst term is the discounted ﬂow of proﬁts at the
current tariﬀ. W en o t et h a ti nad e t e r m i n i s t i cm o d e l ,t h eﬁrm would discount by  rather than (1 − )
and the next two terms would disappear. The second term is the present value of expected proﬁts, ex-ante,
following a shock. The third term is non-positive: it is the present value of the expected loss of entering
today, given that the next policy change is at or below the tariﬀ entry trigger.
We combine the expression in (17) with the operating proﬁt function in (5) to solve directly for 
 as a
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Note that the deterministic model cutoﬀ, 
 ,i sas p e c i a lc a s ew h i c ho b t a i n sh e r ei f =0 .O t h e r w i s e ,t h e
cutoﬀ condition also depends on the uncertainty term, denoted by , which captures the frequency of policy
shock arrivals and expectations about future tariﬀs. We can show that uncertainty in this model generates
a lower cutoﬀ, requiring ﬁrms to be more eﬃcient to enter, than a deterministic tariﬀ at the level .T od o
so note that we must have  ≤ 1,w h i c hr e q u i r e st h a t() ≤ 1, as is clear from the equation above. In
t h ea p p e n d i xw ed e r i v et h i st e r ma s
() − 1=−(1 − ())

−





This is the proportional reduction in operating proﬁts expected to occur if we start at the trigger tariﬀ 
and a policy shock occurs that (with probability 1−()) worsens conditions by generating a tariﬀ above
that trigger level. This inequality is always strict except when the trigger is exactly at the maximum of the
tariﬀ distribution in which case the cutoﬀ is the same as the deterministic. Note also that even though the
policy shock can trigger a lower or higher tariﬀ, it is only the latter possibility that aﬀects the decision.44
44This is an example of the “bad news” principle ﬁrst identiﬁed by Bernanke (1983) and is due to the fact that good news
24In sum, the model predicts that policy uncertainty increases the hurdle for ﬁrms to invest and enter into
new markets relative to the deterministic case. This occurs despite the convexity of operating proﬁts in
tariﬀs. This result along with the fact that at  =0we obtain the deterministic cutoﬀ implies that increases
in uncertainty lower the cutoﬀ under the option approach at any initial tariﬀ below the maximum.
It is also interesting to note how our model can encompass alternative policy regimes. When  ∈ (01)
the model represents a regime of imperfectly anticipated shocks of uncertain magnitude. If instead  =1and
 is degenerate at some 0 then it captures a perfectly anticipated reform where the government credibly
commits to 0 in the following period. When  =0the government has committed to the current tariﬀ, .
Perhaps less obviously, the model can also capture staged tariﬀ reductions that are typical in agreements,
provided that there is uncertainty about their implementation.45
The closed form solution for the cutoﬀ provides other useful insights that we explore in the empirical
work. First, we can derive an uncertainty entry cost premium, , which we deﬁne as the minimum entry
subsidy rate required for the marginal ﬁrm under deterministic policy to enter under uncertainty. Formally,
this is given by the subsidy rate  on ﬁxed costs such that 
 (  0(1 − ))=
 ( =0 ).U s i n g
(18) we obtain  =1− 
−1
 . Note that if the same rate, ,i so ﬀered to all ﬁrms that had not exported
under uncertainty then we obtain the same distribution as under certainty or under a case when tariﬀsa r e
credibly expected not to rise so ()=1 .S i n c e is a summary statistic for the impact of uncertainty on
entry that requires no ﬁrm speciﬁc information on productivity we will provide an estimate for it.
We also use (18) to derive the estimation equation. As an intermediate step it is useful to record the
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which is negative given () ≤ 1 .
Consider now the impact of applied tariﬀso nt h ec u t o ﬀ. In the absence of uncertainty that elasticity
is simply − 
−1, as shown for the deterministic case. It is simple to see that is also the limit value for
has a symmetric eﬀect on payoﬀsw h e t h e rt h eﬁrm is already in or not (since it can enter after the shock) whereas bad news
will only aﬀect those that are already in.
45For example, suppose an agreement is signed that sets a tariﬀ   1 for today and promises a reduction to 0 in the
following period. If exporters believe that the staged reduction will happen in the following period with some probability less
than one then the entry prediction above will apply. Moreover, if the current stage is credible (so  is believed to be the
maximum) then at  we have  ()= =1so exporter entry will behave as if  is permanent. This implies that when
staged reductions are not fully credible the full impact of the agreement on entry will only take place if and when the full
implementation is realized and credible.
25ln

ln |→0. Since most work, theoretical and empirical ignores the uncertainty component we will take that
as our null hypothesis,  =0 , and test if this uncertainty parameter has any ﬁrst order eﬀects . To do so
we employ a ﬁrst order, log linear Taylor approximation to 
 ( ) around  =0and the original applied
policy values (0). We provide the derivation in the appendix. The general form for any period  is
ln(















where  captures second and higher order terms of the approximation. This shows that increasing uncer-
tainty has a ﬁrst order eﬀect and reduces the cutoﬀ even if we are initially at  =0(i.e. in the deterministic
case). This is true for any trigger value of the tariﬀ and strictly so if that trigger is below the maximum
tariﬀ. It also holds for cases when the current applied tariﬀs are zero, which stresses the point that even
ﬁrms that currently, and possibly for some time, have faced zero tariﬀs may not enter if there is some chance
that policy will be reversed in the future. We also see that increasing applied tariﬀs around  =0changes
the cutoﬀ by − 
−1, the deterministic elasticity.46
In sum, we have shown that one potential beneﬁt of an agreement with a country that already applies low
policy barriers is to remove uncertainty about those policies. We have also shown that such an agreement
will generate entry and identiﬁed one potential way to measure the degree of that uncertainty, (0) − 1.
The ﬁnal point that we note is that even though the real option approach we employ is somewhat more
complicated than the standard net present value (NPV) calculation (which only allows ﬁrms to make a once
and for all entry decision) it has two distinct advantages. First, the real option approach clearly captures
the behavior of ﬁrm investment more closely since they have the option to wait and time their investments.
Second, some qualitative and quantitative results are diﬀerent under the two approaches, as we describe in
the appendix.
46While the applied tariﬀ eﬀect around no uncertainty is similar to the deterministic case, it will be attenuated by the
presence of uncertainty. We provide the exact expression in the appendix, but the intuition should be clear from equation
(15) in the last section: a reduction in current tariﬀs will not lead to as much entry if it may be reversed in the future. This
implies that in the presence of considerable uncertainty, e.g. prior to an agreement, the estimated coeﬃcient on the applied
tariﬀ in the equation above will be biased towards zero. In the empirical section we estimate this tariﬀ attenuation eﬀect and
the complementarity between applied tariﬀs and uncertainty reduction on entry decisions.
265 Evidence
We now use the theoretical framework to address two questions. What are the ﬁrst order eﬀects of current
p o l i c ya n du n c e r t a i n t yo nﬁrm entry into exporting? Do trade agreements reduce uncertainty? We will
address these in the context of Portugal’s accession to the EC in 1986, which, as we argued in section
3.2, secured pre-existing preferences in some goods and lowered tariﬀs faced by Portuguese exporters in
others. We ﬁrst describe how to compute a theory-based measure of uncertainty related to the lost proﬁt
term, (); and how to relate the unobserved cost cutoﬀ to observables, namely ﬁrm export decisions. We
then describe the data and implementation, the baseline estimates for entry, and their quantiﬁcation. The
baseline estimates follow the model closely and so are parsimonious, so we also provide some robustness
tests. The ﬁnal section goes beyond entry and examines the implications for export values.
5.1 Empirical Approach
5.1.1 Measuring policy uncertainty
To construct () we require a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ probability distribution . We employ a discrete distribution
that is tractable and covers the main cases that are present in our data. After a policy shock exporters
consider three potential tariﬀ values, ow , edium or igh.
 = , Pr()= for each  ∈ {}
We take =1 so it captures the industrial goods that Portugal exported to the EC free of ad valorem
tariﬀs both after the accession and before it. The high tariﬀ,, captures the EC rate that is applied to
GATT/WTO members that did not receive any preferences. This may somewhat underestimate the degree
of uncertainty in these goods but seems a reasonable approximation of what the Portuguese exporters may
have feared as the worst case scenario. The medium tariﬀ,, represents an intermediate level; it captures
the possibility of transitional preferences that were mostly a feature of Spanish policy towards Portugal prior
to the agreement. It is important to stress that the latter were transitional and could not remain for long
since they were not GATT legal, as we discuss in section 3.2.1. Therefore although we did observe "medium"
tariﬀs during the mid 80’s, the Portuguese exporters likely placed a probability close to zero ( ≈ 0)t h a t
t h e s ew o u l dr e m a i ns i n c ee i t h e ra nagreement would be signed and tariﬀs would transition to the low state
27or negotiations would fail and no preferences would remain.
In the appendix we show that if the tariﬀ was initially high or medium then we can use (19) to derive
( ) − 1=− [1 − (  )
] (21)
The term in square brackets is the percentage proﬁt reduction conditional on a shock that moves tariﬀsf r o m
 to the worst case scenario,  , which happens with probability  . The same term applies to cases
when the initial tariﬀ is low and  is negligible.47 Alternatively, if we consider only a two state world,
 =  , the expression above applies to tariﬀs with either history. Note that the tariﬀsa r ed i ﬀerent across
markets and industries. Moreover, the applied tariﬀ may change over time but the worst case tariﬀ,  ,
is constant in the data over the short period of time we analyze. With information on these tariﬀsa n da n
elasticity assumption (which we describe below) we can construct industry and time varying measures of
this proﬁt reduction measure.
We cannot observe the probabilities that exporters place on a worst case scenario,  .H o w e v e r ,w e
can estimate this as part of the entry equation, provided we assume it is roughly common across industries
and countries, i.e. we can estimate . The similarity across countries in our application is more reasonable
if we restrict our attention to  =Spain, EC-10, which are the markets that Portugal secured access to. Note
that we do allow for the worst case scenario probability, , to vary over time. In fact one of the key
predictions that we test is whether the agreement lowered or even eliminated this probability.
5.1.2 Unobserved cutoﬀsa n dﬁrm export entry
While we do not directly observe whether ﬁrms have costs above or below the cutoﬀ we do observe the
number of ﬁrms and their export status at the country-product level. Our model focuses on variation in
policies over time and across products and the cutoﬀs we derived are common across some sets of ﬁrms. In
particular, producers of a variety  exporting to  will all face a tariﬀ that does not discriminate by ﬁrms, but
rather by product or industry classiﬁcation, denoted  , and so those producers also face the same critical
cutoﬀ 
 . Therefore we examine the fraction of exporters in an “industry”  to each country pair. This
approach has another advantage: it does not require us to be able to follow speciﬁc ﬁrms over time, which
47In the appendix we show that if  were large then there would be an additional term where the high probability and
tariﬀ are replaced by the medium ones. We ignore this extra term since, (a) there is no obvious empirical counterpart for
the medium probability term, (b) it would be highly correlated with the high value, and (c) we have good reasons to believe
 ≈ 0 given these were transitional tariﬀs that could not be sustained under GATT rules.
28is important since we are unable to do this between 1985 and 1986.
The number of ﬁrms (or varieties if the ﬁrm exports more than one product) exporting in  to market
 is at least equal to the mass of domestic producers in  ,  , times the fraction of those ﬁrms with costs
below the cutoﬀ, (
 ). Therefore the relationship between the observed number of ﬁrms,  ,a n dt h e s e
theoretical measures is
ln =l n(
 )+l n +  (22)
where  is a random disturbance term due to measurement error. The term can also capture the potential
for “legacy” ﬁrms: those that survive until period  even though they have costs above 
 . This cannot
occur if current conditions are better than in the past, so a suﬃcient condition to rule out legacy ﬁrms is
that 
 ≥ max{
 ∀  }.I n t h i s c a s e , (
 ) exactly captures the fraction of exporters to this
market. In the case of Portugal in the mid-80’s exporting conditions were improving, as is clear from the
observed high entry rates into EC countries. Therefore, we do not think legacy ﬁrms pose a signiﬁcant issue
in this particular setting. Nonetheless, in the appendix we argue that our approach and results are robust
to certain instances where legacy ﬁrms are present.





So entry has a constant elasticity with respect to the cutoﬀ, the shape parameter ,w h i c hw ea s s u m ei s
similar across industries.
5.1.3 Baseline model
Our basic estimation equation can then be obtained by substituting ( ) in (21) into the cutoﬀ expression






















 (1 − )
+   − ln
¸
+l n + 
We recall the the three assumptions in the baseline estimation to identify the eﬀect of uncertainty: (i) the
probability of reversal to a high tariﬀ  is common across industries,  and countries,  (but ﬁrms have
market and industry speciﬁc information about the impact of that worst case scenario on proﬁts); (ii) the
29shape parameter  is constant over time and common across  (but the other parameter  may vary); (iii)
the elasticities of substitution are constant over time and similar across sectors. In the robustness section
we will discuss the impact of relaxing some of these assumptions.
Given these assumptions we can write the estimation equation in terms of parameters and observable
variables as follows
ln = ˜  +  ln +  +  +  +˜  for each   (24)
where ˜  ≡
1−(  )
−1 captures the uncertainty measure and its impact on entry is estimated by
 = −(1 − ).T h ec o e ﬃcient on the applied tariﬀ is  = −( − 1).T h e terms represent
country-year, country-industry and industry-time eﬀects that absorb among other things, the demand and
cost conditions in ,t h ei n v e s t m e n tc o s t (and any time invariant costs of exporting, e.g. transport or
other non-tariﬀ barriers, that we abstracted from in the theory), the productivity distribution heterogeneity
across industries  as well as other terms that vary at the “” level and were previously included in the
remainder term,  ,a n di n . The remaining part of the disturbance that varies at the  level are
included in ˜  .
We estimate (24) in diﬀerences taking a period after the agreement was implemented,  =1 ,a n do n e
before it,  =0 .
∆ ln = 1˜ 1 − 0˜ 0 + ∆ ln +  +  +˜  for each  (25)
We are interested in testing if there was more entry in industries with higher initial uncertainty, −0 
0, and whether the agreement reduced the probability of a worst case scenario (−0  −1), or even
eliminated it (1 =0 ). If uncertainty played a signiﬁcant role we will then quantify it. To identify these
eﬀects it is important that, even in the change equation, we control for importer eﬀe c t s ,w h i c ha b s o r ba n y
shocks speciﬁc to those markets. We also control for industry eﬀects to capture any productivity, regulation
or other industry shocks that had a common eﬀect on ﬁrm entry to both EC-10 and Spain, the most obvious
being Portugal’s own trade liberalization. Therefore the identiﬁcation will rely on diﬀerential tariﬀsa n d
uncertainty that Portuguese exporters within each industry faced in the EC vs. the Spanish market.
305.2 Data and Implementation
To estimate (25) we collect detailed data on trade policy for Spain and the original EC-10 countries before
and after the agreement, as described in more detail in the data Appendix. So the uncertainty measure
varies not only across industries but also across members of the agreement. For some industries the policy
data are recorded at a ﬁne level of disaggregation, so they could potentially be matched to 6-digit NIMEXE
classiﬁcations for the trade data, which includes over 5000 products (NIMEXE is the predecessor of the
Harmonized System). We do not test the model at this disaggregated level for a few reasons. First, the model
suggests that we deﬁne industries according to a set of characteristics (such as productivity distribution) that
is common across a set of ﬁrms and clearly broader than the 6-digit level. Second, most of the variation in the
policy occurs across industries, rather than within them at the product level. About 80% of the variation
in applied tariﬀs and 75% of variation in the uncertainty measure in exporting to the EC-10 before the
agreement are accounted for by diﬀerences across 2-digit industries (of which there are 99). Those fractions
are lower for Spain but still more than half of the variation is accounted for by cross-industry diﬀerences.
Third, even in 2-digit industries where there is some variation in tariﬀs, an exporter’s perception of the
worst case scenario is likely to be broader than what is implied by the worst case for a single 6-digit good
since he may either export multiple goods and/or fear tariﬀ changes simply because they are reclassiﬁed.48
To construct the uncertainty measure we ﬁrst take  for a product to be the ad valorem conventional
GATT tariﬀ that country  (EC-10 or Spain) had before the agreement.49 We take 0 to be the tariﬀ that 
actually applied to Portuguese exports in that product before the agreement, where we employ data on the
set of preferences that these countries provided to Portugal, as described in section 3.2.1. We then construct
the uncertainty measure in (21) using elasticity values that are consistent with the data for these countries
( =3 ). In the robustness section we provide supporting evidence for this choice of elasticity and show the
results are robust to alternative values. We then aggregate this measure and the applied tariﬀ to the 2-digit
industry level using a simple average.
The tariﬀs that Portuguese ﬁrms exporting to Spain faced in the years 1985 and 1987 appear in Table
2. The average industry in Portugal enjoyed preferential tariﬀs that were nearly 50% below the tariﬀ levied
on the rest of the world. Moreover, we ﬁnd that this diﬀerence is not driven by any one set of goods or
industries. Using the measure of proﬁts lost previously derived we calculate that if Portugal were to lose
48If we were to run the model at the 6-digit level there would be a large number of zeroes. Since our estimation equation is
in logs we would eventually have to drop those categories, which could be where uncertainty was most important.
49If that tariﬀ was not bound in the GATT then we use the autonomous ad valorem tariﬀ that  applied.
31these preferences, the typical exporter would see his proﬁts reduced by over 16% per annum. Note also that
despite the preferences, Portugal did not enjoy duty-free access to Spain prior to the agreement, it faced
tariﬀs of almost 8% on average. Therefore there is scope for gains from applied tariﬀ reduction, uncertainty
reduction and the complementarity eﬀect between the two, which we described in the theory. With respect
to the EC-10, the table shows Portugal enjoyed lower preferential tariﬀs by 1985 but the proportional loss
in proﬁts was nearly as high as in Spain at 15%. The magnitude of EC tariﬀ reductions in 1987 is small
since tariﬀs in industrial products were already zero prior to accession.
5.3 Baseline Estimates
Table 3 provides estimates of the parameters in (25). We ﬁnd that entry is negatively aﬀected by applied
tariﬀs, as predicted by the theory. Moreover, the coeﬃcient on initial uncertainty, −0, is positive, implying
that entry was strongest in the industries that initially faced higher uncertainty.50
One potential concern with the results in column 1 would arise if ad valorem tariﬀs were only one part of
the protection faced by Portuguese exporters that changed. If protection that used other instruments fell by
more in industries with higher uncertainty this would bias our estimates. Therefore we control for changes in
“non-tariﬀ barriers” and speciﬁct a r i ﬀs in columns 3 and 4 respectively.51 Both have the predicted negative
sign but they are insigniﬁcant. Neither aﬀects the baseline results for uncertainty and applied ad valorem
tariﬀs. The results are also robust to including other policy measures (in columns 5 and 6), which we discuss
in detail in the robustness section, either individually, or in combination.
The results discussed thus far exclude any uncertainty measure for the period after the agreement. This
reﬂects an implicit assumption that the coeﬃcient on that variable is insigniﬁcant, i.e. that the agreement
was credible and eliminated the preference reversal, 1 =0 . We test this hypothesis directly in column 2
by including the potential proﬁt loss term evaluated at the post agreement tariﬀs, ˜ 1 .W eﬁnd that this
variable has no signiﬁcant eﬀect, i.e. we can’t reject that 11 =0 , nor can we reject that the probability
of a reversal has fallen, i.e. 11  00. This insigniﬁcance of uncertainty after the agreement and the
50Note that the policy measures vary across industry and for Spain vs. the EC-10 but not within industry across the EC-10.
Therefore we compute clustered standard errors that allow for arbitrary correlation across EC-10 countries within each industry,
and similarly for Spain.
51To construct these measures we use information in the tariﬀ schedules on whether a product line was subject to speciﬁc
tariﬀs, special import authorization or other conditions that were not translated into an advalorem tariﬀ.A s i s s t a n d a r d i n
this type of literature we construct a coverage ratio measure: fraction of products in industry  that are subject to a particular
measure (e.g. speciﬁct a r i ﬀ, or other NTB) and took the diﬀerence before and after the agreement. The adjustments to NTBs
immediately after accession were primarily removals of barriers by Spain and Portugal to harmonize with the EC-10 in order
to comply with GATT provisions not to discriminate against non-member goods. Thus we only coded those changes for Spain.
There were some NTBs left within the EC-10 but these were generally removed only in later years at an EC wide level.
32fact that the restricted version in column 1 is preferred by standard information criteria (shown in the last
two rows of Table 3), leads us to focus on the restricted as the baseline.52
The theory implicitly assumes single product ﬁrms. However, it can be easily re-interpreted as applying
to a ﬁrm’s decision to invest in order to introduce a new product into a country and that is why we focus
on the growth of ﬁrm-product pairs, i.e. varieties. New varieties include both those ﬁrms entering new
market-industry pairs and ﬁrms expanding the number of products within a given market-industry pair.
Three pieces of evidence indicate that our data and estimates mainly reﬂect ﬁrm entry into a new market-
industry. First, the typical Portuguese exporter sells only two varieties (at 6-digit Nimexe) both in 1985 and
1987 (the average is also approximately unchanged at 6). Second, the average variety entry in our sample
is 36% and most of this is accounted for by ﬁrm-industry growth, 33% (Table 2). Moreover, the latter also
accounts for about 0.84 of the variation in variety growth. Finally, when we use market-industry growth as
a dependent variable we ﬁnd results similar to those using varieties in table 3. In fact, the implications for
the estimated probability of reversal are the same, as we subsequently show in Table 7.53
Our baseline results appear to be robust to several potential concerns, so we defer that discussion to
section 5.5 and focus ﬁrst on examining the relative impact of the policies. One simple measure of this
impact is how much variation in entry each of the variables explains. For the full sample we ﬁnd that a one
standard deviation reduction in applied tariﬀs leads to a 0.14 standard deviation increase in entry whereas
for the uncertainty variable that eﬀect is 0.4, which is almost 3 times larger. Using the model structure we
can go considerably beyond this in quantifying the impact of each policy and their complementarity.
5.4 Quantiﬁcation and Counterfactuals
We now employ the baseline results in Table 3 to estimate the probability of reversal and quantify the
importance of uncertainty on entry and value of exporting.
52The results that we discuss subsequently will be qualitatively unchanged if we included the post uncertainty variable.
Moreover, while the magnitude of the tariﬀ and initial uncertainty are somewhat diﬀerent, their ratio is fairly similar with or
without post uncertainty, and as we will see it is that ratio that is key to the quantiﬁcation.
53The regressions equivalent to Table 3 using growth of number of exporting ﬁrms to a market are available on request and
in a previous version of the working paper.
335.4.1 Policy Reversal Estimates
Recall from our discussion of the estimating equation (24) that the coeﬃcients for initial uncertainty and
tariﬀs in column 1 of Table 3 map to the parameters of the model as follows: −0 = 00(1 − ) and









The ﬁrst row of Table 4 shows that the baseline estimate is 0.39 ( =3 ).54 Given that we placed
no constraint on the estimation it is remarkable that the estimate falls in the theoretically feasible range
between zero and one. Moreover, we compute its standard error to be 0.17, which allows us to reject that
it is zero. This indicates that exporters in 1985 believed that the policy was neither ﬁxed, i.e. 0 6=0 ,n o r
certain to improve, i.e. 0 6=0 , so the reform was not fully anticipated. We also re-estimate the baseline
in column 1 of Table 3 at alternative values of  =2 4 and ﬁnd that the reversal point estimates are all
in the feasible range; they increase slightly in , but the diﬀerences are insigniﬁcant. Thus we focus on the
intermediate estimate generated by  =3 , which is also the more relevant elasticity for this data, as we
argue in the robustness section.
Given that  captures an ex-ante average exporter belief, it is hard to deﬁnitively argue that a
particular estimate is too high or low. In order to provide additional quantiﬁcation it is useful to ask
what reform scenarios the estimates are compatible with and whether any seem unreasonable. The baseline
reversal estimate of 00 =0 39 is consistent with two extreme beliefs before the agreement. Either the
policy shock is fully anticipated, 0 =1 , and preferences are lost with probability 0 =0 39, or preferences
will surely be lost, 0 =1 , but the timing of the policy change is uncertain with an arrival rate of 0 =0 39.
While we can bracket our subsequent quantiﬁcation estimates using these extremes we choose to focus instead
on an intermediate case that seems more reasonable and where ˆ 0 =0 62(= \ 00
05) so the policy shock
was likely but not certain, i.e.  ∈(.5,1).55
54We assume  =0 85, which is consistent with the Portuguese data. Recall that  =( 1− )(1 + ) so our assumption is
equivalent to alternative reasonable combinations of these parameters. Our choice was determined by using the average real
interest rate for Portugal in 1983-1995,  =0 03, and an annual death shock probability  =0 125. The latter is similar to
what other authors assume (cf. Constantini and Melitz, 2008, p.24) and is also consistent with the Portuguese data where we
ﬁnd that annual ﬁrm exit rates from production is about 0.17 (calculated from Quadros de Pessoal) which is an upper bound
for the exogenous death shock probability since it includes endogenous exit decisions.
55The intermediate magnitudes seem more reasonable than any of the extremes given the historical context provided in
Section 9. These intermediate estimates are consistent with the following exporter beliefs in late 1984: talks would collapse
and preferences removed with probability 00 =0 39; or talks would continue, but no policy shocks would arrive, and the
current regime would continue with probability 1 − 0 =0 38 or talks would succeed and the accession would go forward with
345.4.2 Policy Impacts on Entry
Since our estimates of  imply it is at least 0.39 and entry is concave in this parameter we will not quantify
the impact of entry using the ﬁrst order approximation in the regression estimate since this will overestimate
its impact. We will instead employ the estimated coeﬃcients to compute the impact implied by the theory
holding all else equal:
ln |1 − ln |0 =l n(
 |1) − ln(
 |0) (27)
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1 −  + 0
¸
where we focus on the baseline estimates where uncertainty is removed, i.e. 1 =1 . Note that the expression
in brackets can be rewritten in terms of the estimated parameters, −0 and ,t h ed a t a˜ 0 and a given
assumption on the arrival rate such as ˆ 0 =0 62, which we can then average over the observations.56 In
table 4 we show that this removal of uncertainty alone generates a growth in entry of about 8 log points,
which is similar across alternative . Given there were about 40428 country×(ﬁrm-product) pairs in total in
the sample this predicts an additional 3167 pairs by 1987. The impact of uncertainty removal can generate
as much as 24 log point growth for those industries where the fraction of proﬁts lost is highest.
We now turn to the elasticity of entry with respect to tariﬀs. In the absence of uncertainty that is simply
given by . So, to the extent that uncertainty was eliminated, the reduction of applied tariﬀs, generated
about 4% growth in entry overall, distributed as follows: 2% into EC-10 (their mean reduction was only
0.7 p.p.) and 20% for Spain (mean reduction of about 7 p.p). Therefore the total predicted entry due to
removal of applied tariﬀs and uncertainty is about 12 log points (.04+.08), slightly lower for EC-10 (10) and
higher for Spain (28).
We are also interested in decomposing the relative importance of applied tariﬀ reductions if uncertainty
had remained unchanged. To compute this counterfactual recall that the applied tariﬀ also aﬀects the
probability (1 − 0) =0 23. The no change probability seems reasonable given the already long path since the start of the
discussions. While the belief of success would seem low given the ex-post realization of the event, we think it may reasonably
reﬂect the information embodied in the 1985 export decisions. To see why note that about half of all shipments in 1985 had
already occurred by March and likely reﬂect decisions to invest that were made 3-6 months earlier, i.e. in 1984, so well before
the accession agreement was signed in June of 1985. Moreover, the typical shipment date in 1986 is May, which is two months
later than usual (and two months after the agreement came into force). This suggests exporters waited for reasons other than
avoiding tariﬀs, since in most industries the average applied tariﬀ was at or near zero for EC-10 countries.
56Conditional on this, the result does not require any assumption for , since its value is subsumed in the parameter estimate.
35uncertainty term, , so we must determine the total eﬀect of the tariﬀ and how attenuated that entry
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.W ee m p l o y
this and rewrite the expression above in terms of the estimated parameters and data. In Table 4 we show
that this factor is 0.56, so under the initial uncertainty the same tariﬀ reductions would have generated
only about half as much entry than if uncertainty was absent. Another way to put this is that the impact
of the tariﬀ reduction when the uncertainty was also removed is substantially magniﬁed. The result is not
sensitive to the choice of .57
In table 5 we employ the estimates above to decompose the total predicted entry into three components:
reduction in uncertainty at initial tariﬀs, reduction in applied tariﬀs at initial uncertainty and the remainder,
which captures the complementarity eﬀect. The ﬁrst column shows the result for EC-10 and Spain combined.
Out of the total predicted growth, which was 12 log points, a share 0.65 (=8/12) is due to the uncertainty
removal at initial tariﬀs, another .15 is due to the complementarity eﬀect. The model predicts that on average
accession would have only generated .19 of this entry if tariﬀs had been reduced at the initial uncertainty.
For the EC, if uncertainty had been unchanged then tariﬀ reductions (mostly in agricultural products) would
have generated almost no entry. Even for Spain tariﬀ reductions alone would have generated only about 0.4
of the predicted entry.
One ﬁnal point regarding quantiﬁcation is what fraction of the entry observed in the data can the policy
changes implied by the theory predict. As we see, in Table 2 varieties increased by 0.36 so the model
accounts for about 1/3 of this. There was a substantial increase in the mass of Portuguese producers in
this period, 0.16 between 1985-1987 (authors calculations from Quadros de Pessoal). Recall that this is
exogenous in our model. Thus we can also ask what is the share of predicted entry probability explained by
policy, ∆ln(  ), we show in Table 5 that trade policy changes explain almost all this increase in the
57The magnitude of the attenuation does depend on how much of the reversal, , is due to the arrival shock. The eﬀect is
bounded by the extremes: if the arrival shock is very likely ( =1 ) the attenuation is .71, if it is unlikely ( = 39) then the
attenuation is .35.
36data for the EC, and 0.6 overall.58
5.4.3 Policy Impacts on the Value of Exporting
We can also estimate the relative importance of applied tariﬀs and uncertainty on the value of exporting
rather than entry decisions. To do so we consider a similar counterfactual to the one before: what is the
predicted total change in the value of exporting, Π, and what fraction is accounted for by the uncertainty
removal at initial tariﬀs, the tariﬀ reduction at initial uncertainty and the complementarity eﬀect.
Using (13) the growth due to the policy changes in the expected export value function for a given ﬁrm is
Π(1 1 =0 )
Π(0 0)
− 1=
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We can see that this growth rate is similar across all ﬁrms that export to the same market-industry pair.
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−
 ,w h e r e
the approximation is exact in a two-state world. The results in table 6 employ the baseline estimates for
 =0 62 and  =3 , previously discussed. When we average this over all industries and ﬁnd that those ﬁrms
export value grew by 9.6% (overall), more so for Spain (22%) than EC-10 ( 7.9%).
We then ask what eﬀect would have been observed if only uncertainty had been removed at the original
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which yields an average growth of exporter value of 5.5% overall. However, the eﬀect is very uneven: for
the EC this eﬀect accounts for almost 0.8 of the total eﬀect. But for Spain it accounts for none of the eﬀect.
The reason is that Spain still had relatively high tariﬀs on Portugal and if uncertainty about them were
removed then they would not increase but they would also not decrease.
Given the last result for Spain it would be tempting to conclude that the applied tariﬀ reductions alone
were responsible for the large gain. However, we recall that applied tariﬀ reductions under uncertainty have
a limited eﬀect on exporter value, as shown in (15). We can verify this directly by calculating the impact of
58The model only explains 1/3 in Spain indicating that other factors were important. Real income in that country for
example increased by 0.1 log points in the period and was expected to continue growing, as it did, by 0.2 between 1985-1989.



















For Spain this implies an average growth of 4.8% so it accounts for only 0.22 of the total predicted eﬀect with
the remaining, 0.78, being driven by the complementarity from applied tariﬀ reductions made permanent
by eliminating the probability of reversal.
An alternative way of measuring the cost of incredible reforms is the uncertainty entry cost premium,
which we deﬁned previously as the minimum entry cost subsidy rate required for the marginal ﬁrm under
deterministic policy to enter under uncertainty  =1−
−1
 . To induce the no uncertainty level of entry
the government would have to subsidize the 3167 ﬁrms predicted to enter above. For the industries with
highest uncertainty we ﬁnd a subsidy rate of .22; on average we ﬁnd it is .08. Without information on 
we can’t estimate the exact subsidy costs but the model allows us to compute an order of magnitude. The
subsidy cost for a particular industry-country pair is   =  
 (1−),w h e r e
 is the equilibrium
operating proﬁt of the marginal entrant under certainty. Thus the subsidy per entrant for the highest
uncertainty industries ( =0 22)w o u l dc o s t15
 when  =0 85.59
5.5 Robustness: entry estimates
We now discuss some robustness tests of the baseline results.
Column 5 of Table 3 adds the change in the standard deviation of the tariﬀ faced by Portugal in each
industry, i.e. ∆( ln) where  ∈  . There are two possible motivations for this control. First, one
may argue that our model is misspeciﬁed and for some reason the exporters care not only about the mean
of the applied tariﬀ in an industry but also its dispersion, particularly since we are aggregating ﬁrms up to
the industry level. To the extent that our uncertainty variable includes not just the threat tariﬀ but also a
nonlinear transformation of the applied tariﬀ may be capturing some of that potential eﬀect. The second
argument would be that our measure of uncertainty is incorrect and that perhaps the standard deviation is
the correct one. However, this variable is insigniﬁcant and does not change the value or signiﬁcance of the
theoretically based uncertainty measure.
59The government could oﬀer lower subsidies to more productive ﬁrms and still obtain the same entry outcome. However,
productivity-speciﬁc subsidies would require information that the government does not possess.
38We now provide some supporting evidence for our use of common elasticities and investigate if the results
are sensitive to it. There are two assumptions: ﬁrst, the typical elasticity within industry  is similar to the
typical elasticity in another industry. Below we provide some direct evidence based on estimated elasticities
that supports this assumption. Second, the elasticity of substitution across industries is similar to the typical
elasticity within them. We do not have estimates for cross industry elasticities to fully justify this second
assumption and thus we examine directly whether the results are robust to it.
The elasticity of substitution across industries is possibly lower than within industries. Our model can
be extended to accommodate this. In particular, if we assume that the subutility index  in (1) is a Cobb-
Douglas aggregator with shares   then the elasticity of substitution across industries is unity (so smaller
than ) and the key diﬀerence for our model would simply be that the price index is now  ,w h i c hi s
deﬁned only over the varieties in each industry  . Therefore, we should rewrite the  term as follows





Our baseline estimation is in diﬀerences and we can show that a number of components that this alter-
native speciﬁcation of demand introduces are diﬀerenced out. Moreover, the use of industry and country
eﬀects implies that we are left with the residual variation in the price index that varies at both the country
and industry level, ∆ln .60
This residual price index variation is only an issue to the extent that it may be correlated with the policy
measures. Recall that these price indices reﬂect the prices of all varieties sold in those industries in country
. Therefore it will be dominated by the domestic varieties and imports from countries other than Portugal,
since the latter is a small exporter. Therefore we do not think that Portugal’s expansion into their markets
had a substantial direct eﬀect on ∆ln . However, there may be omitted variable bias if a third factor
aﬀected these indices and was correlated with the changes in policy faced by Portugal. The most obvious
candidate would be if the EC-10 or Spain were simultaneously reducing their tariﬀs on the rest of the world
and those reductions were correlated with the policy changes they were implementing for Portugal. This
60T os e et h i sc l e a r l ys u p p o s ew ec a nr e w r i t et h ep r i c ei n d e xa sap r o d u c to ff o u rt e r m s , =    ,w h i c hr e ﬂect
variation that is only country-time (), country-industry ( ) or industry-year speciﬁc(  )a n dt h el a s tt e r m , ,w h i c h
can vary along all three dimensions. If we consider changes in ln we then have
∆ln =(  − 1)∆ln +





The key thing to note is that in terms of our diﬀerenced estimation equation (25) the industry and country eﬀects continue
to capture all the variation in the costs and demand ( ()1−) and also a substantial part of the variation in the price
index, namely ∆(ln  ).
39was not the case for the EC-10 external tariﬀ in the period we consider. However, Spain was reducing its
external tariﬀs on the rest of the world (to converge to the European Common tariﬀ) and these reductions
were correlated to the ones faced by Portugal. Therefore we use changes in Spain’s tariﬀst ot h er e s to ft h e
world to proxy for ∆ln .
The results that control for industry and country speciﬁc price index changes are presented in column 6
of Table 3. We ﬁnd a positive relationship between the price index and entry. This is as predicted by the
theory: an increase in the price index in an export market makes Portuguese exporters more competitive and
thus raises entry. This eﬀect is insigniﬁcant and including it does not change the baseline results regarding
uncertainty or the applied tariﬀ eﬀects. The same is true if we also include all the other applied policy
controls in columns 2,3 and 4. Since these controls are insigniﬁcant and do not aﬀect the key coeﬃcients we
focus on the baseline result without them, which is also preferred by standard information criteria.
We now examine our assumption that the typical elasticity within industries is similar across 2-digit
categories. Thus far our discussion has mostly focused on the case when the elasticity of substitution of
 =3 . This is based on our calculations using the sub-sample of estimates from Broda, Limão and Weinstein
(2008) for Spain and the other EC-10 countries (except for Greece, Belgium and Ireland, which were not
in their sample). The median for these countries over all industries is 3.4 and the mean is 4.5. Since they
estimate the elasticity at a more disaggregated level (hs-4) than what we use here (roughly hs-2), it is
possible their estimates are upper bounds on the 2-digit elasticities. To test if our results are sensitive to
this we re-estimated the baseline regression for diﬀerent elasticites. As we show in Table 4 for example, our
central results are not sensitive to using  =2 4.
We can also provide evidence for one of our simplifying assumptions in the model and baseline estimation:
similar  across countries and industries. While this elasticity is not constant within several 2-digit categories,
it turns out not to vary that much across those broad industries. For example, if we take the estimates of
 at the hs-4 level for Spain we ﬁnd that only 10% of its variation occurs across 2-digit industries. There
is also not considerable dispersion across countries: the median elasticity across all hs-4 categories ranges
only from 2.8 in Spain to 3.9 in Austria. Moreover, they are highly positively correlated across countries.61
There is also not a lot of dispersion in the typical elasticity across 2-digit industries in these countries. As
we noted the overall median is 3.4 and, in 90 out of the 93 industries for which we have data, the median
61For example, if we take the parameter on applied tariﬀs that we assume to be constant,  ( − 1),f o re a c hi n d u s t r y
 in Spain and regress it on the median value for that industry across the EC-10 countries we obtain a coeﬃcient of 1.2 with
a s.e. of about 0.2.
40(over European countries) of  is between 2.2 and 4.8, only 3 industries have higher values: 5.5-6.3. Given
these estimates are subject to measurement error it is unlikely that there would be signiﬁcant statistical
diﬀerences between most of them. Nonetheless we also re-estimated the baseline speciﬁcation in column 1
of Table 3 dropping the three industries with higher elasticities (Nimexe codes 18, 47 and 87) and veriﬁed
the results are unchanged.
Finally, we note that the variation that does exist in elasticities across industries is not in any obvious
group. For example, industries 1-14 (basic agricultural products) have a median elasticity of 4–only
somewhat higher than the overall sample. One potential concern with the agricultural products is that they
are subject to non-tariﬀ barriers and account for about 22% of the sample. If these NTBs are not changing
then they are controlled for by the country industry eﬀects,  . If they are changing, as we know they
are for Spain, and are doing so in a way that is correlated with our uncertainty measure this would bias
our estimates. One way to address this is to control for NTB changes directly. We did so in column 3 of
Table 3 and veriﬁed the results did not change. One may also object to applying a monopolistic competition
framework to agricultural goods and argue that they should be dropped altogether. We are agnostic about
this but nevertheless when we do drop basic agricultural goods we still ﬁnd that the uncertainty measure
still has an eﬀect that is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the baseline case. However, the applied
tariﬀ coeﬃcient is now less than half in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁc a n t .T h i si sn o ts u r p r i s i n gs i n c e
the tariﬀ reductions by the EC-10 mostly occurred in those agricultural products so the remaining ones in
the sample were those already receiving signiﬁcant tariﬀ concessions. This again stresses that uncertainty
reduction was a key motive for entry.
Table 7 provides two other robustness tests. First, we re-estimate the baseline using entry of ﬁrms per
industry into a market. This alternative dependent variable leads to the same probability of reversal, as we
can see comparing column 2 with the baseline in column 1. Thus the entry eﬀect we capture is mostly one
of ﬁrm entry in an industry, as previously argued. Second, in column 3 we re-estimate the baseline using
growth in varieties between 1987 and the average in three years prior to the agreement (1983-1985). The
probability of reversal is still positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Its value is slightly lower than
when we focus on 1985 as the pre agreement period, which suggests that in 1983-4 the exporters believed
policy was less likely to change. A similar result holds for ﬁrms (column 4).
In sum, the baseline estimates are fairly robust to alternative potential concerns.
415.6 Policy Impacts on Total Exports
While our main interest is on the impact of policy on entry and export ﬁrm value, we can also employ our
framework to analyze the value of exports. In this section we present the basic estimation equation, which
we relate to the structural parameters and then use to quantify the relative impacts, in an exercise analogous
to the one for entry in Table 5.
Total exports in any given industry to a particular market are the product of the number of varieties








× ¯  (32)
We obtain ¯  by averaging (4) over all exporting ﬁr m ss oi ti sa ﬀected by applied tariﬀsa n dr e ﬂects
the entry cutoﬀ.U s i n gt h ee x p r e s s i o nf o r¯ , the Pareto distribution and the derived cutoﬀ, 
 ,w eo b t a i n
the export equation as a function of uncertainty and applied policy measures, as detailed in the appendix.
The estimating equation in diﬀerences can be written in a format similar to the one for entry
∆ ln = 1˜ 1 − 0˜ 0 + ∆ ln +  +  +˜  for each  (33)
where the coeﬃcient for uncertainty is now  = −

1−(−( − 1)) and for the tariﬀ it is  = − 
−1.
We estimate this equation based on the diﬀerence between 1987 and 1985, as done for the entry, and
ﬁnd that both of these variables have the expected sign and are statistically signiﬁcant. We also ﬁnd that
the post agreement uncertainty eﬀect is insigniﬁcant. The exact parameter estimates for  and 
themselves are not as interesting as the quantiﬁcation exercises that they allow us to perform so we focus
on the latter. For example, using the baseline assumption of  =3 , we derive the implied probability of
reversal; the point estimate is 0.45 and we can’t reject that it is equal to the estimate obtained with the
entry equation (0.39). We then use this reversal estimate, assuming  =0 4505, and the structure of the
model to predict the impact of policy on exports.
Similarly to the entry exercise, the total predicted export growth due to policy is given by the sum of the
uncertainty removal at initial tariﬀs, ln |1 |0 (derived in the appendix), and the tariﬀ reduction in
the absence of uncertainty (∆ ln ). We ﬁnd this is 34 log points for the EC-10 and Spain combined.
The average growth in the data is 55 log points (as seen in Table 2) so the policy change predicts a large
42fraction of this. The predicted change accounts for an even larger fraction of the observed value if we net
out the increase in the mass of ﬁrms, the term  , which is exogenous in the model and grew about 16 log
points. When we take this into account the model explains 0.87 of the remaining growth, as shown in the
last column of the ﬁrst row of Table 8.62
In Table 8 we also decompose that predicted growth in a way that is analogous to the entry results
in Table 5. The fraction of the 34 log points accounted for by the uncertainty removal at initial tariﬀsi s





ln , in the appendix and estimate it is 0.69. This is less than
unity and thus conﬁrms the complementarity of tariﬀ and uncertainty reductions for export values.63 We
can see that complementarity eﬀect accounts for almost a quarter of the predicted growth for Spain, which
is about the same fraction as the uncertainty eﬀect at initial tariﬀs. For the EC most of the growth was
due to the direct uncertainty removal eﬀect (0.75), which is reasonable since most tariﬀsw e r ea l r e a d ya t
zero. This contrast in the sources of growth of exports provides another interesting motive to consider both
the EC-10 and Spanish case since some recent PTAs may look more like the EC-10 case (e.g. Colombia
securing pre-existing preferences received in the US market) and others like Spain’s (e.g. Korea obtaining
tariﬀ reductions and securing them).
6C o n c l u s i o n
We provide a framework to study the eﬀect of TPU on ﬁrm investment and export decisions. Despite its
dynamic nature, the model is highly tractable and delivers clear predictions for how to empirically compute
TPU and estimate its impact. Applying this to a speciﬁc setting that is particularly appropriate, we ﬁnd
that, (i) before accession to the EC, Portuguese exporters stood to lose about 16% of exporting proﬁts if
they lost their preferences in the EC-10 or Spanish markets and (ii) they believed such an event had a real
probability of occurring before the PTA (39%). The agreement eliminated this TPU and the overall trade
policy changes can account for a considerable share of ﬁrm entry and export value in the data (more for
the EC-10 then for Spain). If, counterfactually, the applied tariﬀ reductions had been implemented at the
62Note that the predicted export growth is higher than the growth due to entry, suggesting that the policy changes also
aﬀected average exports. Such an eﬀect would arise naturally if ﬁrms could make technology upgrading or capacity building
investments after entry. Such upgrading is likely given the large increase in export values for existing ﬁrms, that we derived
previously. In related work we show that our model can be extended to incorporate such upgrading decisions.
63It is not as pronnounced as the 0.56 factor for entry since now tariﬀs have a direct eﬀect on exporters that are already in
the market regardless of uncertainty.
43original TPU level then only 20% of the total predicted ﬁrm entry growth would have been realized. These
results have policy implications for the many countries still receiving unilateral preferential tariﬀs, which are
subject to the discretion and uncertainty of policy making, as Portugal was before 1986. Thus our results
provide one reason why these programs are not always successful in promoting trade and investment and
how this may change if those preferences are secured through formal PTAs.
Our framework can be used and extended to address various other interesting questions. First, the basic
structure of the model can be applied to other settings. One example is tariﬀ bindings in the WTO (as in
Handley,2011). Another is the U.S. threat of non-renewal of China’s MFN status and whether its elimination
in 2001 (upon China’s WTO entry) can explain the subsequent export boom to the U.S. Second, the model
is tractable enough that it can be extended to include eﬀects of uncertainty on intensive margin decisions
(e.g. via technology upgrading decisions as in Bustos, 2011) and endogenous exit. Third, the model can
also be extended to analyze the role of own TPU on imported intermediates, which may play an important
role in increasing ﬁrm productivity (cf. Goldberg et al, 2010). Another interesting extension is to examine
the interaction of uncertainty between trade policy and demand conditions, to analyze for example the role
of TPU during the great trade collapse.64
Our estimates also have broader implications. For example, the ﬁnding that the elasticity of entry and
exports with respect to applied tariﬀ changes is considerably attenuated in the presence of uncertainty has
implications for explaining trade ﬂows and the resulting welfare gains. To see this, note that if those
elasticities are estimated under uncertainty (but neglect to account for it) then ex-ante predictions based
on them will tend to underestimate the entry and export impact of subsequent credible reforms. Second,
e x - p o s ta n a l y s i so fP T A so f t e nﬁnd large trade eﬀects even if applied policies are low. From this it is often
inferred that either those applied policies are correlated with other unmeasured but applied trade costs that
were also reduced, or that their trade elasticity is very high. Our results provide an alternative explanation:
the large trade impact is partly due to the elimination of TPU. This uncertainty can also help explain the
border puzzle: why trade across an international border is considerably smaller than within a country even
when trade costs appear similar. Appropriate trade elasticities are central in the evaluation of “static”
welfare gains from trade in CGE and new trade theory models (cf. Arkolakis et al, Forthcoming). The
attenuation eﬀects suggest we must be careful about which elasticities we should use for such evaluations;
64A related application is the interaction of trade elasticities with other sources of uncertainty, such as exchange rates. We
did not ﬁnd much evidence for adverse eﬀects of exchange rate volatility in the 1981-1990 period, but these eﬀects may have
grown more important during the lead up to adoption of the Euro.
44more fundamentally our results suggest that these evaluations should focus on models that are inherently
dynamic.
In conclusion, our results highlight why and how much trade policy uncertainty aﬀects investment and
entry into new markets. While credibility is often mentioned as an important component of a policy reform,
it is generally diﬃcult to measure its impact. To the extent that our approach and results do just that they
may be of broader interest to economists and policy makers interested in evaluating the impact of other
policy reforms on ﬁrm-level decisions.
45A Theory Appendix
A.1 Value Functions
The set of equations in (9),(10),(11), and (12) is linear in the four unknowns and can be solved algebraically.
The solution to the current values of exporting, Π(),a n dw a i t i n g ,Π(), are respectively given by (13)
and (14) in the text, as is the unconditional expected value of exporting, EΠ(0)=E[(0)]1−,w h e r e a s
the conditional value is
EΠ (0 | 0 ≤ ¯ )=
E[(0)] − E[(0) | 0  ¯ ](1 − )
(1 −  + )(1 − )
A.2 Cutoﬀ and proﬁtl o s se x p r e s s i o n s
We combine the expression in (17) with the operating proﬁt function in (5) to solve directly for 
 as a
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Using this and the deﬁnition below for () we obtain (18) in the text.
1. () ≤ 1










































where the last inequality follows from





and the fact that the LHS is a weighted average of two terms, one equal to 
−
 and the other equal to
E(− |  ), which is less than 
−
 . When the current tariﬀ is at the maximum of the support of ()
such that  = , then the diﬀerence in brackets and the term (1 − ()) are both zero.
2. () is increasing in the current tariﬀ






















 +( 1− ())E(− |  ≥ )+()
−
 ]
= [(1 − ())E(− |  ≥ )]1− ≥ 0




[(1 − ())E(− |  ≥ )]
− ∈ [0] (35)
This implies that as the current tariﬀ  increases, the proportional gap between the deterministic and
uncertain cutoﬀ narrows. We can see that that if  =  the derivative goes to zero. Then
ln

ln = − 
−1
and the elasticity of the cutoﬀ under uncertainty evaluated at the tariﬀ maximum equals the elasticity at
the deterministic cutoﬀ.
A.3 Cost cutoﬀ results







Using the expression for 






















































As we show in (35) 
ln
1
 ∈ [01], so entry is less responsive to tariﬀ changes under uncertainty. The
two exceptions (limiting cases) are when  =0(i.e. tariﬀs are deterministic) or when  is already at the
maximum of the tariﬀ distribution.
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1 −  (1 − )
¶
 0
which is negative since we showed above that  − 1  0 when 0.












473. First-order Cutoﬀ Approximation
We take a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of ln around  = 0 and  =0 .





=l n (ln0  =0 )+l n (ln0  =0 )+




+( l n − ln0)
 ln |(0=0)
 ln








Using the deﬁnition for 
 , equation (37), noting that  ln ln|=0 =0and simplifying we obtain the

















4. Real Option vs. NPV Cutoﬀs
I ns e c t i o n4o ft h et e x tw en o t et h a t
(i) the cutoﬀ under the option approach is always lower than under the NPV approach
To see this note that in the absence of the option to wait the last term in (34) drops out and we obtain
the standard NPV cutoﬀ, denoted 
 .S i n c et h el a s tt e r mi n( 3 4 ) i sn o n - p o s i t i v et h eo p t i o nc u t o ﬀ is lower,
i.e. 
 ≤ 
 , which implies less entry than under the standard NPV case.
(ii) the cutoﬀ under the NPV approach can be higher or lower than the deterministic and thus reductions
in uncertainty can lead to less incentive for entry under the NPV approach.
If the deterministic tariﬀ were such that 
−
 = E(−) then these two cutoﬀs coincide (as can be seen








 ). But if instead we hold
the current tariﬀ at its long-run mean, i.e.  = E(0), then the convexity of proﬁts in tariﬀsi m p l i e st h a t
the Marshallian cutoﬀ is higher than the deterministic cutoﬀ. To see this note that if  = E(0) then
()
− =( E(0))
− ≤ E(−) (Jensen’s inequality for 1)s o
 ≤ 
 at the long run mean of the tariﬀ
distribution. This implies that if we actually eliminate uncertainty while holding the current tariﬀs equal at
the mean in the deterministic case then there would be less incentive for entry, which is the opposite eﬀect
of uncertainty from what we ﬁnd using the real option approach.
48B Data and Estimation Appendix
B.1 Policy Data
Pre-accession policy data
The earliest trade data for Portugal is from 1981 and the closest full EC trade policy schedule before
then is for 1980 (OJ L 342, 31.12.1979, p. 1—382 ). This, and the fact that EC applied tariﬀs to Portugal in
industrial goods were the ones set in the 1977 agreement, and thus remained in place until 1985, lead us to
initially digitize and use the 1980 schedule.65 The 1980 schedule already reﬂects some of the EC multilateral
tariﬀ bindings negotiated in the Tokyo Round. However, some of these bindings, which we use to construct
our uncertainty measure, continued to be reduced over a period of time.66 Therefore, if the worst case
scenario for Portuguese exporters between 1981-1985 was the EC binding then it may have entailed a lower
tariﬀ than that implied by the 1980 binding. Even for those goods where the binding was falling the 1980
binding may still be the appropriate one to capture the exporter expectations we model if for example the
exporters did not immediately update their beliefs about the tariﬀ distribution.
We obtained the 1984 trade policy schedule for Spain. This schedule was published by the International
Customs Tariﬀ Bureau in the International Customs Journal. We believe this was the only full schedule
published in the 1980s for Spain and it contains Spain’s preferences relative to Portugal and the EEC as well
as its policy relative to the rest of the world. The documentation we found implies that Spain’s preferential
tariﬀs for Portugal remained unchanged between 1984 and 1985 because the EFTA-Spain agreement that
regulated these had reached a phase requiring additional negotiations of indeterminate length.
Post-accession policy data
To construct the tariﬀ proﬁle faced by Portugal immediately after the agreement we applied the conces-
sions schedule in the Articles of Accession, Protocol 3 for Spain (Oﬃcial Journal L 302 , 15/11/1985 P. 0410)
and Article 243 for the EC (Oﬃcial Journal L 302 , 15/11/1985 P. 0094). These imply staged reductions of
12.5% per year for Spain and 14.2% for EC-10 with some exceptions for certain goods and industries.
Applied Protection and Uncertainty Measures
The schedules for the EC and Spain were manually keyed into digital format at the tariﬀ line level by
a ﬁrm specialized in data entry. We performed a number of checks to ensure that the quality of the entry
and kept track of the few tariﬀ lines with various combinations of minimum and maximum tariﬀs, speciﬁc
tariﬀs and seasonal tariﬀs.67 We then applied preference margins for the EFTA-Spain and EC-Portugal
agreements to compute the applied tariﬀ faced by Portuguese exporters in 1985. We applied the staged
reductions of the Articles of Accession to these schedules for the EC and Spain to compute the 1987 tariﬀ
proﬁle. These digitized schedules yield our tariﬀ line measures of applied tariﬀs in 1985 and 1987. There
are about 9500 tariﬀ lines for Spain and 6500 lines for the EC in any particular year. Finally, we digitized
a set of pre- and post-accession NTMs applied by Spain at the 4-digit industry level based on accession
documentation submitted to the GATT.68
Concordance and Aggregation
We constructed our tariﬀ panels using the Brussels Tariﬀ Nomenclature to maintain consistency between
published schedules and the preference margins stipulated in pre- and post-accession agreements. However,
our ﬁrm level data are classiﬁed by Nimexe so we map each BTN code to a 6-digit Nimexe code using a
65While our baseline results only use data for 1985 and 1987 to isolate the eﬀect of the agreement in 1986, we also planned
and ran robustness tests that include earlier years.
66"Implementation of MTN concessions: Note by the secretariat, revision" TAR/W/8/Rev.3, October 15, 1981
67For example, Spain levies an ad valorem tariﬀ of 14% on product 66.01-A-I "Umbrellas and sunshades: Covered with
fabrics of silk or man-made ﬁbres" subject to a minimum speciﬁct a r i ﬀ of 75 pesetas each. We use the ad valorem tariﬀ as our
tariﬀ line applied measure and track the presence of the minimum tariﬀ in an indicator variable.
68See "List of Non-Tariﬀ Restrictive Measures Applied by Portugal and Spain before and after their Accession" L/5936/Add.5,
5 March 1987.
49time-consistent 6-digit Nimexe. We constructed the concordance by digitizing the EC’s oﬃcial concordance
between the BTN and Nimexe.69 To further maintain time-consistency, our concordance allows for changes
the Nimexe system over the sample period. We tracked these yearly changes according to schedules found
in the Eurostat publication External Trade Nomenclature of Goods, Volume 5 (1990). When there are
multiple BTN codes mapped to single Nimexe code, we average within the Nimexe code. The same schedules
give us the pre- and post- accession worst case tariﬀ used to compute the uncertainty measure as described
in the main text. We aggregate by industry up to the 2-digit Nimexe level by taking the arithmetic mean of
tariﬀs and our uncertainty measures. Within each industry, we keep track of detailed tariﬀ line information
by computing the shares of tariﬀ lines with complex and speciﬁct a r i ﬀs and use these as additional controls
in the robustness checks.70
B.2 Firm and Aggregate Data
Our ﬁrm level data is from the Portuguese census (INE). We use the transaction level trade data available for
the period 1981-1990 from customs declaration forms processed by INE. Since the 1981-1987 trade data had
not previously been used we did several basic exercises to check their accuracy. We found no law establishing
minimum value thresholds for ﬁlling out the customs forms in this period. There are no discontinuities
at low values in the shipment value distribution. We conﬁrmed that the aggregate yearly values of both
imports an exports matched those reported by the oﬃcial INE printed publication "Estatisticas do Comercio
Externo" for several years. INE converts data for all years into euros at a rate of 200.482 esc/euro even
before the euro was implemented.
Firm identiﬁers
Some of the additional evidence in appendix section B.4 makes use of the shipper’s identiﬁer variable
(labelled NPC) to determine if it is a new or existing exporter to a market. INE reports that this is a unique
ﬁrm identiﬁer after 1986 and it is in fact used to match trade data to employment and other ﬁrm-level
data collected by INE in recent years in other work. There is also a unique identiﬁer in 1981-1985 but
so far neither INE nor Portuguese customs have been able to provide a correspondence that would allow
linking speciﬁc ﬁrms between 1985 and 1986. Given that the pre-1986 data had not previously been used we
requested INE to conﬁrm with Portuguese customs that pre-1986 identiﬁers were unique and allowed us to
track ﬁrms in that period, which they did. We further investigated this by calculating statistics by NPC in
each year (e.g. industry of modal product exported, # products, # destinations, total shipment value and
weight, etc) and verifying they were highly correlated in adjacent years, e.g. the elasticity of total export
values by NPC between 1985 and 1984 is one, similarly for other variables. Moreover, these relationships
were identical to those found when comparing adjacent years in the post-1986 data where the NPC identiﬁer
was known to be unique.
Destination country
To ensure that country codes are consistent over time we used the oﬃcial list of changes in trade
partners published yearly in the "Estatisticas do Comercio Externo". When a country splits, the code for
the “larger” unit (e.g. Russia) is the same as the existing (e.g. USSR) and a new code is created for others
(e.g. Ukraine). When a country merges (e.g. Germany) we assign the same code as the largest of the
existing (West Germany) and drop the other (East Germany).
69See "Commission Regulation(EEC) No 3840/86 amending the nomenclature of goods for the external trade statiscts of the
Community and statistcs of trade between Member States (NIMEXE)" (Oﬃcial Journal L368, 29/12/1986).
70Our estimation method requires an industry level net entry dependent variable, but this is not the only reason to aggregate
tariﬀ line policy data over the sample period. From 1980 to 1987 the Brussels Tariﬀ Nomenclature (BTN) and Nimexe
classiﬁcations are updated annually, but our tariﬀ schedules reﬂect the classiﬁcation in place at the time of implementation.
Spain, Portugal and the EC further diﬀerentiate tariﬀs within BTN categories. BTN and Nimexe are time-consistent and
equivalent at the 2-digit level.
50B.3 Data sources and deﬁnitions
Aggregate Regressions (Table 1 and B1; 1981-1990):
• Exports (ln): Nominal value of exports in euro of all goods to country i in year t. Source: Author’s
calculations based on INE data.
• Number of Firms Exporting (ln): Number of uniquely identiﬁed shippers with positive exports to i in
year t. Source: Author’s calculations based on INE data.
• Exports per Firm (ln): ln(ExportsNumber of ﬁrms). Source: Author’s calculations based on INE
data.
• Real Importer GDP (ln) country i, year t in billions of importer currency. Source: IMF International
Financial Statistics (IFS)
• Importer Price Index (ln): ln nominal GDP-ln real GDP in local currency. Source: IMF IFS
• Annual Exchange Rate (ln): Simple average of ln monthly rate, where latter is deﬁned as ln((escudo/importer
currency)/200.482). The ﬁxed conversion factor from esc to euro is 200.482 and plays no role in the
regressions. Source: Authors calculations from IMF IFS (monthly).
• Exchange Rate Volatility (ln): standard deviation of log monthly changes in the year. Source: Authors’
calculations.
Firm and policy data in estimates of Tables 2-8
• Change in Number of Firms: ln(# ﬁrms exporting to  in  , 1987) - ln(# ﬁrms exporting to  in
 , 1985) where  is an EC-11 country and  corresponds to a NIMEXE 2-digit industry. Source:
Authors’ calculations.
• Change in Number of Firm-Varieties (ln): ln(# varieties exported to  in  , 1987) - ln(# varieties
exported to  in  , 1985) where “varieties” are deﬁned as distinct 8-digit NIMEXE products exported
by each ﬁrm. Source: Authors’ calculations.
• Change in exports: ln(export value to  in  , 1987) - ln(export value to  in  , 1985). Source: Authors’
calculations.
• Pre Tariﬀ (GATT): ln where  is 1+advalorem rate at product level that GATT members faced in
Spain or EC-10, which is then averaged to Nimexe 2-digit industry. Source: International Customs
Journal: Spain, No. 24, 16th Edition, 1984. EC :Oﬃcial Journal, L342, 31.12.1979, p. 1-382.
• Pre Tariﬀ (Portugal): ln where  is 1+advalorem rate at product level Portugal faced in Spain or
EC-10, which is then averaged to Nimexe 2-digit industry. Source: International Customs Journal:
Spain, No. 24, 16th Edition, 1984. EC :Oﬃcial Journal, L342, 31.12.1979, p. 1-382.
• Post Tariﬀ (Portugal). ln for immediate post agreement period that Portugal faced in Spain or EC-
10, constructed as described in previous section. Source: Articles of Accession, Oﬃcial Journal L 302
, 15/11/1985.
• Applied Tariﬀ Standard Deviation Change: ∆std(ln) where the standard deviation is over tariﬀs
Portugal faced in each Nimexe-2 industry; the change is between the pre and post tariﬀ.
• Uncertainty: Proportional reduction in per period proﬁts if the tariﬀ f a c e db ya ne x p o r t e rr e v e r t s
from the preferential tariﬀ received prior to accession (Pre Tariﬀ above) to the tariﬀ received by all
non-preferential partners (i.e. the conventional GATT member tariﬀ). Source: Authors’ calculations
using equation (21) with  =3in the baseline regressions.
51• NTM Share Change: Diﬀerence in share of lines in 2-digit industry with min, max or other tariﬀ
measures between post and pre-agreement period. Source: Authors’ calculations.
• SpeciﬁcT a r i ﬀ Share Change: Diﬀerence in the share of lines in 2-digit industry with speciﬁct a r i ﬀs
between post and pre-agreement period. Source: Authors’ calculations.
• Price Index Proxy Change (ln): Diﬀerence in Spain’s external tariﬀ between post and pre-agreement
period. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Other data (Figures and text)
• Import & Export to GDP ratios (Text). Source: Pinheiro et al (1997).
• Trade Shares (Figs. 1 and 2): Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
• Export Firm Entry Growth (Fig. 3) ln(# ﬁrms exporting to country i at t)-ln(# ﬁrms exporting to i
in 1985). Source: Authors’ calculations.
• Export price index (ln): 1985 base chain price index for exports. Source: Authors’ calculations from
yearly price deﬂators of export goods to all destinations in Pinheiro et al (1997).
• Employment: Source: Authors calculations using trade data matched to ﬁrm employment data
(Quadros Pessoal) by INE.
• Firm identiﬁer (NPC): unique code that can be used to match ﬁrms between 1981-1985. Portuguese
customs changed this code in 1986 and it is consistent for 1986 onwards but not between 1985 and
1986.
• New exporter in year t: Firm exporting somewhere at t but nowhere in t-1. Source: Authors’ calcu-
lations.
• Gross Entry rate in year t: (Total # new exporters in t)/(# exporters t-1). Source: Authors’ calcu-
lations.
• Gross Exit rate in year t: (# exporters with positive exports in t-1 and none in t)/(# exporters with
positive exports in t). Source: Authors’ calculations.
52B.4 Additional aggregate evidence and estimation details
In this appendix we provide additional details on the aggregate evidence in section 3.2 that supports both
some of the modeling assumptions and predictions of the theoretical approach. We also discuss theoretical
and empirical motives for focusing on net or gross entry.
B.4.1 Model implications for net entry
The model in section 4 has implications for both net and gross entry so we could potentially consider them
separately. However, the nature of the data and entry/exit processes may not always allow us to distinguish
between them separately. The central prediction of interest is that certain reductions in uncertainty lower
the cost threshold that ﬁrms must satisfy to enter a market and thus, all else equal, imply larger numbers
of ﬁrms exporting. This larger number can be due to two eﬀects
1. Entry of “new” ﬁrms: Firms that previously did not export and would not have entered the market
in the absence of this uncertainty reduction but now do so.
2. Re-entry or non-exit of “existing” ﬁrms: if a ﬁrm is hit by a shock that leads it to exit then if it is
still below the threshold it will re-enter but if it is above the threshold it will not. When the threshold
falls with uncertainty this ﬁrm is now more likely to re-enter or not exit in the ﬁrst place.
To test the central prediction (lower uncertainty leading to higher number of exporters) we must ﬁrst
address the basic issue of constructing an appropriate counterfactual. In Table 1 we considered the number
of ﬁrms exporting to a preferential market relative to those exporting to the rest of the world before vs.
after the PTA while controlling for aggregate potential determinants of entry. To decompose the eﬀect of
uncertainty into new vs. existing ﬁrms using the exact same approach and time period we would require data
on a consistent set of ﬁrm identiﬁers over the full period. These identiﬁers are not available for 1985-1986 so
this is the ﬁrst diﬃculty in decomposing the eﬀe c t .W ed oh a v ec o n s i s t e n ti d e n t i ﬁers for a few months prior
to accession (early 1986) and after accession, which we explore below. However, even if we had consistent
ﬁrm identiﬁers over the full period there is a deeper issue that can prevent us from clearly decomposing the
eﬀect. Namely, the fact that we cannot observe the “death” shock and may therefore not observe the exit
at all (e.g. if a ﬁrm suﬀers a cost increase that would make it exit if the cutoﬀ were unchanged but not if
the cutoﬀ cost increased). So, if we focused only on gross entry (e.g. those by ﬁrms never before in that
market) we could miss an important eﬀect of uncertainty.
Given this, our focus in the paper is on the eﬀect of uncertainty on the overall number of exporters
rather than decomposing it into its separate eﬀects. However, to provide some additional motivation for the
model we also want to ask whether we can rule out some alternative explanations for the aggregate data. In
particular, one concern is whether the agreement increased re-entry (or lowered exit) and thus could have
lead to a higher number of ﬁrms even if the threshold had not changed. We ﬁrst describe our deﬁnitions and
accounting methodology for the raw data analysis mentioned in section 4. We then provide some additional
robustness checks in light of the predictions of the model.
B.4.2 New vs. continuing ﬁrms: deﬁnitions and stylized facts
To ﬁx ideas we decompose the number of ﬁrms exporting to a particular market into continuers (), deﬁned
as those that exported at  and  − 1, and entrants (), those that export at  but not  − 1.T h e t o t a l
number of exporters, , is therefore
 =  + 
53Since  =( 1− ) × −1 (where  is the exit rate between  and  − 1, i.e. number of exits
−1 ),w ec a n
write the net entry rate as

−1
− 1= − 
When we examine the raw data we ﬁnd that average yearly exit rates in the period after agreement (87-
90) are similar to pre-agreement for Spain (about 0.35) and actually increase for the EC-10.71 Therefore, the
growth in the number of ﬁrms in these markets appears to be driven by gross entry. Some direct evidence for
this is provided in the graph below that compares the yearly number of entering ﬁrms into diﬀerent markets
and shows a diﬀerentially larger eﬀect for Spain and EC-10. The EC and ROW levels and trend prior to
the agreement are very similar but after the agreement the EC had on average almost 800 additional new
exporters per year. Spain started from a lower level than the ROW but ended up at a similar level and the
diﬀerential increase in new exporters is over 750. The eﬀect is even more pronounced if compared to a single






















Figure B1: Number of New Firms Exporting to
Preferential and Other Markets
The ﬁgure above indicates that the increase in the number of exporting ﬁrms can’t be explained solely
by continuing ﬁrms choosing to stay in EC markets following accession. Our approach is to identify a
counterfactual with the cohort of ﬁrms we observed exporting to the market just before the agreement
was implemented , or shortly thereafter (since some of the potential new entrants may have waited until
implementation to decide to make the ﬁxed cost investment). Given that the consistent identiﬁer starts in
January 1986 we ﬁrst simply use the cohort of ﬁrms that were exporting in 1986. If the agreement lead
to no immediate entry then change in the stock of ﬁrms relative to the 1986 cohort provides a reasonable
measure of the stock of “new” entrants. But if some entry already occurred, as the large increase in net
entry in 1986 suggests, then this will be an underestimate.
The graph below shows the total number of ﬁrms and those in the post-86 cohort. The latter are zero
in 1986 by deﬁnition and increase extremely fast, clearly driving the growth in the total number of ﬁrms.
The rapidly narrowing diﬀerence between the lines indicates the decline in the number of the 86 cohort, so
any re-entry for that initial cohort is insuﬃcient to oﬀset exit. This suggests that the agreement eﬀect is
71This treats the EC-10 as a single market to facilitate comparison in some of the graphs with the rest of the world. The
econometric evidence will treat each country as a separate martket. The exit rates for the larger EC-10 countries such as
Germany increase from .39 in 1985 to .45 in 87, in France it goes from .43 to .48. I have not yet done it for others.


















1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
year
# Firms # Post-86 Cohort
Figure B2: # of Total vs Post-Accession
Exporters to Spain
B.4.3 Contribution of new ﬁrms to exports: 1986-1990
Table B1 uses the raw data to further quantify the aggregate importance of new Portuguese exporters to
EC-10 and Spain after accession. Since we are interested in capturing the more immediate eﬀects of the
agreement and do not control for other factors we focus on a period close to the accession date: 1986-1990.
Between these years alone, real exports to the world grew by 50%. Real exports to Spain in this period
increased about 785 million euro and accounted for 23% of this growth and the EC accounted for 59%. Note
that these ﬁgures start in 1986 so they miss the considerable growth that already took place relative to 1985
(about 7%) that was fully driven by the EC-10 and Spain (real exports to the ROW actually fell in 1986).
The reason we do so is that starting in 1986 we can track speciﬁc ﬁrms. Thus we can decompose the export
growth into diﬀerent ﬁrm cohorts. We ﬁnd that 46% of the increase in exports between 1986 and 1990 to
Spain and 62% to EC-10 is from “new” ﬁrms, i.e. those that did not export to those markets in 1986.
We view these numbers as a lower bound for the contribution of ﬁrms that entered after the agreement
since they exclude the many ﬁrms that entered in 1986. While this is a limitation of the data we can still
provide some additional criteria to identify ﬁrms that are “likely” new exporters in 1986. The agreement
only started to be implemented in March 1986. So some ﬁrms may have waited until that date or later
in the year before starting to export. This can be either because the actual tariﬀ reductions did not start
55until March (in case of Spain and some EC agricultural products) or because they wanted to be certain that
the agreement would in fact be implemented before incurring any ﬁxed costs. In fact, we observe that the
typical ﬁrst month of shipment across all ﬁrms to Spain in 1986 is May, which is two months later than the
median in previous years. For EC-10 countries the median increased about 1 month in 1986. This suggests
that we can use a ﬁrm’s ﬁrst shipment to these markets in 1986 as a way to help identify when it enters.
Using this information we augment the “new exporters” category to include those that export in 1987 or
later and also those ﬁrms that exported in the second half of 86 but not the ﬁrst. We use this deﬁnition
of “new” exporters in the results mentioned in the text.72 The criterion identiﬁes about 532 ﬁrms in the
case of Spain but it is important to note that they only account for about 2% of exports to Spain in 1986.
For the EC the criterion typically identiﬁes about 200 ﬁrms. Using this criterion the share of new ﬁrms in
export growth between 1986 and 1990 goes up to 54% for Spain and 73% for the EC.
When making year to year comparisons one potential issue is that if one of the groups fares particularly
badly in the ﬁnal year then the decomposition may be misleading. We account for this by averaging exports
for each cohort over the years 1987-1990 and calculating the diﬀerence relative to 1986. Doing so generates
results similar to the table above: the growth accounted by post-mid 86 ﬁrms is now 50% for Spain and
76% for EC-10. In sum, we ﬁnd new exporting ﬁrms accounted for a signiﬁcant fraction of export growth
to Spain and EC between 1986 and 1990.
B.4.4 Decomposing the eﬀect of accession between new and existing ﬁrms
As we noted, the raw data shows a substantial number of “new” ﬁrms exporting to Spain and EC-10 between
86-90 and their importance in export growth. However, this is consistent with diﬀerent explanations for new
entry: (a) it is common to all export markets; (b) entry relative to Spain and EC is already present before
the agreement, or; (c) it is generated by other determinants, e.g. income and price changes. In Table B2,
we report the full results of our counterfactual experiment for new entry and average annual exports due
to accession. The ﬁrst column replicates the results in the baseline for ease of comparison. There are two
basic changes relative to that sample. First, the new sample excludes countries with zero exports of existing
ﬁrms in 1981 or 1986 or zero exports of new ﬁrms, so the control group is in some ways more similar to the
“treatment”. Second, we exclude the initial years, 1981 and 1986.73 Neither of these changes to the sample
has much eﬀect on the aggregate export speciﬁcation (not shown), which looks similar to the one for the
full sample in column 1.
As we can see in column 3 there is a positive signiﬁcant eﬀect of the agreement on total exports of new
ﬁrms for both Spain and EC-10. Decomposing this eﬀect into the number of new ﬁrms (column 4) and
their average sales (5), we see that it is the former that increases exports. In fact, we see that the average
sales of new ﬁrms post agreement are lower, which provides evidence that the agreement changed the entry
threshold making it easier for smaller ﬁrms to export.
72This deﬁnition raises the question of seasonality (some ﬁrms’ products may only be demanded in the second half of a year)
so we restrict these new exporters identiﬁed in the second half of 86 to the subset that also export in the ﬁrst half of 1987.
73We must necessarily do when we use the post-initial year deﬁnition. We do the same for comparability purposes when
employing alternative deﬁnitions of new entrants that may include some exports in the initial year.
56To decompose the impact of the agreement we also ran a similar speciﬁcation for the existing ﬁrms
(column 2). There is a positive eﬀect of the agreement for both Spain and the EC. We then use the
estimates to predict the average change in export value to a market implied by the agreement for new ﬁrms
(from column 3) and existing ones (column 2). We do so for each year 87-90, deﬂate it and average them.
The sum of these two predictions is in table B3 below over 500 million euro for Spain and over 600 for EC-10
of additional exports on average per year after 1986. New ﬁrms account for about 30% of this predicted
change to either of them.
The last two columns of Table B3 show a similar decomposition for the number of ﬁrms using the
estimates in Table B2 (column 4) and an analogous speciﬁcation for existing ﬁrms (not shown). The
predicted average increase in the number of ﬁrms due to the agreement is about 3500 for Spain and over
7200 for all the EC-10 countries combined. A large part of this change is from new ﬁrms (0.68 for Spain
and 0.78 for the EC), as we report in section 3.2.
57B.5 Firm-level estimation details
1. Empirical Implementation of Tariﬀ Uncertainty in Discrete Case
To construct the empirical measure of () we consider a discrete probability distribution for tariﬀs.
We then ask, given that a policy shock above the current trigger  arrives, what is expected value of the
proportional loss in proﬁts? This quantity is summarized by () − 1, which we now compute for a two-
and three-state tariﬀ process relevant to our empirical implementation.
Two State Tariﬀ Distribution: High, Low
Initial State ( = ) Probability () ( = ) − 1
  0











In the two state case, any ﬁrm with an entry trigger  ≥ would enter when the tariﬀ is in the high
state. The likelihood of a shock to trade policy leading to a worse outcome is zero. As was the case with
a general continuous distribution, the cutoﬀs in the deterministic and uncertain model will coincide at the
maximum. In the low state, () − 1 is nonzero and less than unity. In the estimation, we construct the
observable counterpart to the () − 1 from tariﬀ data and assumptions on .
Three State Tariﬀ Distribution: High, Medium and Low






























The three state distribution is slightly more involved, but makes it clear how to generalize to many
discrete states. We argue in the empirical section that Portugal had “medium" preferential tariﬀsw i t h
respect to Spain by 1983 of an indeﬁnite nature due to the EFTA-Spain agreement. If  −→ 0,t h e nw e
see that the measures in the second and third row coincide with our empirical implementation for the EC
and Spain.
582. Legacy ﬁrms




 and may reﬂect legacy ﬁrms, i.e. those above the
current cutoﬀ that entered when conditions were more favorable in the past but have not yet died. In this
appendix we argue that if legacy ﬁrms are present then depending on what caused them they will either
have no impact on our estimates or bias them towards zero. The true fraction is related to the model’s
















 ) if 
  max
− 
and (1 − −) is the survival probability until time  of ﬁrms that were present at the maximum cutoﬀ





 )+l n 
=  +l n
where  are the structural model variables that determine ln(
 ). Writing this in changes and
then adding an orthogonal error term,  ,w eo b t a i n
∆ln = ∆ + ∆ln + ∆ln + 
 =  +  +  +  + 
where  and  represent a set of industry and importer dummies;  ≡ ∆ln and  is the log
change in the subset of policy variables in  that have time, industry and importer variation.
Given the deﬁnition of the orthogonal term, , the only potential source for bias arises from the possible
correlation between  and  conditional on  and . Thus we can immediately see that if  has
either only industry or importer variation (or some linear combination of the two) there is no legacy bias.
We now discuss what we think is the most relevant case and argue why this conditional correlation is zero.
Suppose that after accession the cutoﬀ is at an historic high, so that post accession +1 =1and












. We now consider the following special cases for
variation in the cutoﬀ before accession:
(a) only importer speciﬁce ﬀects, such as favorable exchange rate or demand shocks. Then  =  since
all industry speciﬁct e r m si nt h ec u t o ﬀs cancel out therefore the conditional correlation with  is
zero
(b) only industry speciﬁce ﬀects, such as ﬁxed costs of entry to export in an industry. Then  =  and
t h es a m ea r g u m e n ta sa b o v eh o l d s
We also argue that if the source of the legacy was a policy variable then the legacy would bias estimates
down, i.e. against ﬁnding any result. To see this note that in order for legacy to be caused by policy the
model requires lower applied tariﬀs at some point − prior to the pre-accession year in 1985. This is very
unlikely given that the EC-10 and Spain were implementing Tokyo Round reductions during this period.
59Nonetheless suppose this occurs (and aggregate conditions and uncertainty are ﬁxed) then










Assuming that post 1985 tariﬀs are below or equal to 1985 levels (+1 ≤  ) the legacy eﬀect would
generate a larger number of ﬁrms in that industry prior to accession. So when the tariﬀs fall with accession
we see a relatively lower increase in number of ﬁrms in those industries with more legacy ﬁrms. Moreover,
those are the industries with relatively higher initial tariﬀs (since they had to increase before 1985 to generate
legacy) and thus larger tariﬀ reductions (since all tariﬀs eventually went to zero). A similar argument holds
for the uncertainty variable.
B.6 Aggregation to Total Exports
In this appendix we derive the estimating equation for total exports presented in the text and the expressions
used to decompose the policy eﬀects in Table 8.








× ¯  (40)
where average sales ¯  ≡ 
−
 ˜  are obtained by averaging (4) over all exporting ﬁrms and with a














¢,t h ec u t o ﬀ expression and simplifying we
obtain
ln =(  −  +1 )l n
 − ln +l n +l n

 − ( − 1)
− ln +l n +l n (41)
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1 −  + ()






where  = −+1
−1 ln 
 (1−) +l n − ln +l n 
−(−1) +l n +l n.
The impact of removing uncertainty at initial tariﬀs on exports used in Table 8 is therefore
ln |1 − ln |0 = −




1 −  + 0(0)
1 −  + 0
¸
(42)
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The leading term is the full elasticity of total exports to tariﬀ c h a n g e sa n dt h et e r mi nb r a c k e t si st h e
attenuation, which is equal to  ln
 ln |00 ln
 ln |1=0, and is reported in Table 8. It is straightforward to
show that the attenuation term is always between zero and one.
To obtain the estimation equation (33) in the text, we take a ﬁrst order approximation of the uncertainty
term around  =0and substitute that and the constructed measure ˜  in (41) to obtain
ln = ˜  +  ln +  +  +  +˜  for each   (44)
where  = −

1−( − ( − 1)),  = − 
−1 and the  terms capture all the terms in  deﬁned
above. If we then diﬀerence this equation we obtain (33).
60References
Aizenman, J. and Marion, N. P. (1993). Policy Uncertainty, Persistence and Growth. Review of International
Economics, 1(2):145—63.
Arkolakis, C. (2011). A Uniﬁed Theory of Firm Selection and Growth. Working Paper 17553, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Arkolakis, C., Costinot, A., and Rodrìguez-Clare, A. New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? American
Economic Review.F o r t h c o m i n g .
Baier, S. L. and Bergstrand, J. H. (2007). Do free trade agreements actually increase members’ international
trade? Journal of International Economics, 71(1):72—95.
Baier, S. L., Bergstrand, J. H., and Vidal, E. (2007). Free Trade Agreements In the Americas: Are the
Trade Eﬀects Larger than Anticipated? The World Economy, 30(9):1347—1377.
Baldwin, R. (1988). Hyteresis in import prices: The beachhead eﬀect. American Economic Review,
78(4):773—85.
Baldwin, R. and Krugman, P. (1989). Persistent trade eﬀects of large exchange rate shocks. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 104(4):635—54.
Barro, R. J. (2006). Rare Disasters and Asset Markets in the Twentieth Century. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 121(3):823—866.
Bernanke, B. S. (1983). Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 98(1):85—106.
Bernard, A. B., Eaton, J., Jensen, J. B., and Kortum, S. (2003). Plants and Productivity in International
Trade. American Economic Review, 93(4):1268—1290.
Bernard, A. B. and Jensen, J. B. (1995). Exporters, Jobs, and Wages in US Manufacturing: 1976-87.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, pages 61—112.
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, J. B., Redding, S. J., and Schott, P. K. (2007). Firms in international trade. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 21(3):105—130.
Bloom, N. (2009). The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks. Econometrica, 77(3):623—685.
Bloom, N., Bond, S., and Reenen, J. V. (2007). Uncertainty and investment dynamics. Review of Economic
Studies, 74(2):391—415.
Broda, C., Limão, N., and Weinstein, D. E. (2008). Optimal tariﬀs and market power: The evidence.
American Economic Review, 98(5):2032—65.
Burstein, A. and Melitz, M. J. (2011). Trade Liberalization and Firm Dynamics. Working paper, Harvard
University.
Bustos, P. (2011). Trade Liberalization, Exports, and Technology Upgrading: Evidence on the Impact of
MERCOSUR on Argentinian Firms. American Economic Review, 101(1):304—40.
Campa, J. M. (2004). Exchange rates and trade: How important is hysteresis in trade? European Economic
Review, 48(3):527—548.
Chaney, T. (2005). Productivity overshooting: The dynamic impact of trade opening with heterogeneous
ﬁrms. mimeo, University of Chicago.
61Chaney, T. (2008). Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Margins of International Trade. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 98(4):1707—21.
Constantini, J. and Melitz, M. (2008). The dynamics of ﬁrm-level adjustment to trade liberalization. In
Helpman, E., Marin, D., and Verdier, T., editors, The Organization of Firms in a Global Economy,
chapter 4, pages 107—141. Harvard University Press.
Das, S., Roberts, M. J., and Tybout, J. R. (2007). Market entry costs, producer heterogeneity, and export
dynamics. Econometrica, 75(3):837—873.
Dixit, A. K. (1989). Entry and exit decisions under uncertainty. Journal of Political Economy, 97(3):620—38.
Estevadeordal, A., Freund, C., and Ornelas, E. (2008). Does Regionalism Aﬀect Trade Liberalization toward
NonMembers? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(4):1531—1575.
Evenett, S., Gage, J., and Kennett, M. (2004). WTO Membership and Market Access: Evidence from the
Accessions of Bulgaria and Ecuador. Staﬀ report, Universitat St. Gallen.
Frankel, J. A. (1997). Regional Trading Blocs. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC.
Goldberg, P. K., Khandelwal, A. K., Pavcnik, N., and Topalova, P. (2010). Imported Intermediate Inputs and
Domestic Product Growth: Evidence from India. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(4):1727—1767.
Grinols, E. L. and Perrelli, R. (2006). The WTO Impact on International Trade Disputes: An Event History
Analysis. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(4):613—624.
Handley, K. (2011). Exporting Under Trade Policy Uncertainty: Theory and Evidence. Working Paper
Series ERSD-2011-20, World Trade Organization.
Hassett, K. A. and Metcalf, G. E. (1999). Investment with Uncertain Tax Policy: Does Random Tax Policy
Discourage Investment? Economic Journal, 109(457):372—93.
Helpman, E., Melitz, M., and Rubinstein, Y. (2008). Estimating trade ﬂows: Trading partners and trading
volumes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2):441—487.
IMF (2004). Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade Flows - Some New Evidence. Technical report, International
Monetary Fund.
Impullitti, G., Irarrazabal, A. A., and Opromolla, L. D. (2011). A Theory of Entry Into and Exit From
Export Markets. Working paper, New York University.
Irwin, D. A. (1994). The GATT’s Contribution to Economic Recovery in Post-War Western Europe. NBER
Working Papers 4944, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Jones, V. C. (2008). Generalized System of Preferences: Background and Renewal Debate. CRS Report for
Congress RL33663, Congressional Research Service.
Karacaovali, B. and Limão, N. (2008). The clash of liberalizations: Preferential vs. multilateral trade
liberalization in the european union. Journal of International Economics, 74(2):299—327.
Kee, H. L., Nicita, A., and Olarreaga, M. (2009). Estimating Trade Restrictiveness Indices. Economic
Journal, 119(534):172—199.
Kehoe, T. J. (2005). An evaluation of the performance of applied general equilibrium models of the impact
of NAFTA. In Kehoe, T. J., Srinivasan, T. N., and Whalley, J., editors, Frontiers in Applied General
Equilibrium Modeling, chapter 13, pages 341—377. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Limão, N. (2007). Are preferential trade agreements with non-trade objectives a stumbling block for multi-
lateral liberalization? Review of Economic Studies, 74(3):821—855.
62Limão, N. and Tovar, P. (2011). Policy choice: Theory and evidence from commitment via international
trade agreements. 85(2).
Mansﬁeld, E. D. and Reinhardt, E. (2008). International institutions and the volatility of international
trade. International Organization, 62(04):621—652.
Melitz, M. J. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry productivity.
Econometrica, 71(6):1695—1725.
Pereira, A. M. and Andraz, J. M. (2005). Public Investment in Transportation Infrastructure and Economic
Performance in Portugal. Review of Development Economics, 9(2):177—196.
Perroni, C. and Whalley, J. (2000). The new regionalism: trade liberalization or insurance? Canadian
Journal of Economics, 33(1):1—24.
Pinheiro, M. et al. (1997). S è r i e sL o n g a sp a r aaE c o n o m i aP o r t u g u e s ap ò sI IG u e r r aM u n d i a l ,V o l u m eI-
Sèries Estatìsticas. Banco de Portugal, Lisboa.
Roberts, M. J. and Tybout, J. R. (1997). The decision to export in colombia: An empirical model of entry
with sunk costs. American Economic Review, 87(4):545—64.
Rodrik, D. (1991). Policy uncertainty and private investment in developing countries. Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, 36(2):229—242.
Ruhl, K. J. (2008). The International Elasticity Puzzle. Working paper, NYU Stern.
Sala, D., Schröder, P. J. H., and Yalcin, E. (2010). Market Access Through Bound Tariﬀs. Scottish Journal
of Political Economy, 57:272—289.
Treﬂer, D. (2004). The Long and Short of the Canada-U. S. Free Trade Agreement. American Economic
Review, 94(4):870—895.
U.S. International Trade Commission (2008). Andean Trade Preference Act:Impact on U.S. Industries and
Consumers and on Drug Crop Eradication and Crop Substitution, 2007. Technical Report Publication
4037, United States International Trade Commission.
63Table 1: Portuguese Export Growth Margins 1981-1990
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable (ln): Exports Number of Firms Exports/ﬁrm
EC10Post 86 0.232*** 0.451*** -0.219***
[0.0829] [0.0411] [0.0710]
SpainPost 86 1.146*** 1.159*** -0.0129
[0.199] [0.132] [0.113]
Real Imp. GDP (ln) 1.045*** 0.598*** 0.447*
[0.306] [0.137] [0.258]
Imp. Price Index (ln) 0.167** 0.0185 0.148**
[0.0776] [0.0374] [0.0655]
Exchange rate (ln) 0.211*** -0.00118 0.212***
[0.0763] [0.0365] [0.0653]
Observations 1305 1305 1305
Adj R2 0.92 0.97 0.75
Notes:
Includes dummies for country and year. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***
p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1 Sample: Aggregate values to each country of
destination where data is available. For variable deﬁnitions, sources and summary
statistics see Appendix B.Table 2: Summary statistics for ﬁrm-level baseline regressions
Total Spain EC-10
Change in Number of Firms* 33.0 91.1 24.7
(55.1) (62.6) (48.7)
Change in Number of Varieties* 35.7 101 26.4
(60.7) (69.1) (53.3)
Change in Exports* 55.3 135 43.9
(157) (150) (155)
Pre Tariﬀ** (Portugal) 3.13 7.89 2.45
(5.66) (5.10) (5.40)
Pre Tariﬀ** (GATT) 8.67 14.1 7.95
(5.14) (7.75) (4.20)
Post Tariﬀ** (Portugal) 1.74 1.33 1.79
(3.91) (3.51) (3.96)
Tariﬀ Change** (Portugal) -1.39 -6.56 -0.66
(2.90) (4.78) (1.44)
Applied Tariﬀ Stand. Dev. Change*** -0.64 -2.86 0.33
(1.25) (1.86) (0.69)
Price Index Proxy Change*** -0.19 -1.52 0.00
(0.88) (2.06) (0.00)
NTM Share Change*** -2.32 -18.66 0.00
(10.9) (25.4) (0.00)
Speciﬁc Tariﬀ Share Change*** -0.37 -3.01 0.00
(2.80) (7.45) (0.00)
Proportion of Proﬁts Lost if Preference Reversed
Initial Uncertainty 15.5 16.0 15.4
(10.9) (9.52) (11.1)
Post Uncertainty 18.8 29.4 17.3
(10.8) (15.0) (9.08)
Observations 731 91 640
Notes:
Sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses), all multiplied by 100.
* 100  ∆ln(x) where x = fﬁrms, varieties, exportsg.
**100ln(1+t) where t is the advalorem rate; ”Pre tariﬀ” is evaluated in 1985 (pre-accession);
one measures Portugal’s preferential rate and the other tariﬀs faced by GATT members; ”Post
Tariﬀ” is the 1987 (post-accession) tariﬀ faced by Portugal; ”Tariﬀ Change” is a simple diﬀer-
ence.
*** See Appendix B for sources and additional details. Proﬁt loss:1   (0V =hV ) (assuming
 = 3). We normalize the loss measures in regressions by dividing it by    1.Table 3: Firm-product entry growth into EC-10 and Spain (by industry)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable : Change in (ln) Number of Firms
Initial Uncertainty 4.399** 5.626** 4.301** 4.431** 4.351** 4.752**
(0 > 0) [1.772] [2.756] [1.810] [1.788] [1.839] [1.854]
Applied Tariﬀ Change -3.006** -4.273* -3.072** -2.919** -3.113** -3.520***
( < 0) [1.260] [2.271] [1.266] [1.247] [1.291] [1.260]
Post Uncertainty -1.51
(1  0) [3.277]
NTM Share Change -0.166
[0.256]
Speciﬁc Tariﬀ Share Change -0.579
[1.034]
Applied Tariﬀ SD Change 0.468
[4.144]
Price Index Proxy Change 1.946
[2.066]
Observations 731 731 731 731 731 731
R-squared 0.471 0.471 0.472 0.472 0.471 0.471
No. of parameters 101 102 102 102 102 102
AIC 1083 1085 1084 1084 1085 1084
BIC 1551 1558 1557 1557 1558 1558
Notes:
Structural parameters and expected sign in parentheses below regressor names. All speciﬁcations include country
and industry eﬀects. Clustered standard errors in brackets (industryEC-10). *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, *
p < 0:1. Sample: Spain and EC 10 countries, 1987-1985. Assumes  = 3. AIC and BIC denote Akaike and Bayes
Information Criterion. See Supplementary Appendix Table 1 for summary statistics.Table 4: Reversal, attenuation and entry estimates
Value of  = 2 3 4
Probability of Reversal 0.36 0.39 0.42
(standard error) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18)
Tariﬀ elasticity attenuation factor 0.56 0.56 0.55
Entry growth, uncertainty removal (mean !) 0.08 0.08 0.08
Entry growth, uncertainty removal (min !) 0.24 0.24 0.24
Notes:







 , see Section 5.4, with s.e. obtained using delta method
( = 0:85). Conditional on ph, the attenuation and theoretical uncertainty term
U can be derived using regression estimates independently of  assumptions. We
take ph = (Pr. reversal)0:5 and compute attenuation and entry growth at mean
!. The attenuation factor is the ratio of the entry elasticity to tariﬀ changes at
initial uncertainty relative to no uncertainty, see equation (28). We compute entry
due to uncertainty removal as the log diﬀerence in the number of entrants at post
vs. initial uncertainty using k  [ln(U1)   ln(U0)] and assume post-uncertainty is
removed, U1 = 1.
Table 5: Entry counterfactuals and quantiﬁcation
Total Spain EC
Share of predicted entry probability due to:
Uncertainty removal (at initial tariﬀs) 0.65 0.28 0.80
Tariﬀ reduction (at initial uncertainty) 0.19 0.40 0.11
Complementarity 0.15 0.32 0.09
Share of predicted entry probability explained by policy 0.61 0.33 1.03
Notes:
We use the initial uncertainty estimate from Table 3 in calculations (but results are similar
if  = 2; 4). Predicted average entry probability is the sum tariﬀs reductions, b∆ln, and
removal of uncertainty at initial tariﬀs. Entry growth from uncertainty removal is the log
diﬀerence in the number of entrants at post vs. initial uncertainty using k  [ln(U1)   ln(U0)]
(we assume post-uncertainty is removed, U1 = 1). Counterfactual shares of predicted entry
hold initial tariﬀs and uncertainty ﬁxed, respectively. The complementarity share captures the
remaining entry growth from simultaneously reducing tariﬀs and uncertainty. The share of
predicted entry probability explained by policy is the ratio of policy predictions relative to the
one observed in the data.Table 6: Value of exporting counterfactuals and quantiﬁcation
Total Spain EC
Share of predicted exporter value due to:
Uncertainty removal (at initial tariﬀs) 0.57 0.00 0.79
Tariﬀ reduction (at initial uncertainty) 0.10 0.22 0.05
Complementarity 0.34 0.78 0.16
Predicted growth in average value of exporter (p.p.) 9.6 22 7.9
Notes:
We use the initial uncertainty estimate from Table 3 to calculate the average growth in the value
of exporter as
e(1;1=0)
e(0;0)   1, see equation (13) and section 5.4. Using the same formula, the
share of uncertainty removal is computed with initial tariﬀs held ﬁxed at 0 followed by the share
of tariﬀ reductions with uncertainty held ﬁxed at 0 > 0. The complementarity share captures
the remaining exporter value growth from simultaneously reducing tariﬀs and uncertainty.
Table 7: Probability of reversal robustness
Sample 1987-1985 1987-pre mean
Dependent variable (ln), no. of: varieties ﬁrms varieties ﬁrms
Value of  = 2 0.36 0.36 0.27 0.26
3 0.39 0.39 0.29 0.28
4 0.42 0.41 0.31 0.30
Notes:
Assumes  = 0:85, for any other value of , simply divide by 0:15=0:85 and multiply
by the new (1   )=. The 1987-1985 sample uses the growth between 1987 and
1985, which is the baseline. The 1987-pre mean sample uses the growth between
1987 and the average of the three years before the agreement: 83, 84, 85.
Table 8: Total exports counterfactuals and quantiﬁcation
Total Spain EC
Share of predicted total exports due to:
Uncertainty removal (at initial tariﬀs) 0.59 0.23 0.75
Tariﬀ reduction (at initial uncertainty) 0.28 0.53 0.17
Complementarity 0.13 0.24 0.08
Share of predicted total exports explained by policy 0.87 0.72 0.96
Notes:
Calculations use an initial uncertainty estimate from the total export regression where  = 3 and
the probability of reversal is estimated at 0.45, see section 5.6 and appendix (results are similar if
 = 2; 4). Average predicted total exports are the sum of the tariﬀ reduction, B∆ln, and the
eﬀect of uncertainty removal at initial tariﬀs. Total export growth from uncertainty removal is
the log diﬀerence in exports at post vs. initial uncertainty using (k +1)[ln(U1) ln(U0)] (we
assume post-uncertainty is removed, U1 = 1). Counterfactual shares of predicted exports hold
initial tariﬀs and uncertainty ﬁxed, respectively. The complementarity share captures captures
the remaining export value growth from simultaneously reducing tariﬀs and uncertainty. The
share of total export growth explained by policy is the ratio of policy predictions relative to
exports observed in the data net of the aggregate growth in number of Portuguese ﬁrms.